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Executive summary
1. Calculating equilibrium wages
A ‘lack of international competitiveness’ is often put forward as an explanation of 
the high current account deficits and rising private and public indebtedness that are 
at the root of the euro crisis. The southern euro-area member states are deemed to 
have overspent before the crisis and thus are now uncompetitive, while northern 
European countries have implemented structural reforms and restrained wage 
increases. Hence, large economic imbalances have accumulated and wages are a 
crucial variable for overcoming the economic crisis that has paralysed the European 
economy for over seven years. 
Standard measures of competitiveness such as unit labour costs use indices that 
depend on the choice of base year. In addition, the focus on unit labour costs 
implies that non-price competitiveness factors are excluded from the analysis. As 
a consequence, they do not provide sufficiently useful information on the relative 
levels of competitiveness at a given moment in time nor do they explain the causes 
behind lack of competitiveness. 
We develop the concept of nominal equilibrium wages, which avoids problems with 
the base year of price indices and provides useful information on the levels of the 
variable. We measure competitiveness as the deviation of actual wage costs from 
nominal equilibrium wage levels for countries and sectors. Equilibrium wages are 
not market clearing wages, but the wage levels at which all sectors in the euro area 
would be on a balanced growth path, defined by having the same return on the 
capital stock, so that all regions and sectors grow at a uniform rate. Wages higher 
6than equilibrium are ‘overvalued’ and cause competitive disadvantages; below 
equilibrium, they are competitive and accelerate growth. By including the return 
on capital in the analysis of competitiveness we also take into account some non-
price competitiveness components, which are related to the amount of capital in the 
economy, as well as productivity.
The concept and analysis of equilibrium wages take into account both long-run 
supply side and short-run demand side conditions. Because wages are part of 
production costs, they must be related to broader productivity developments, 
technological progress (innovation, R&D) and the accumulation of capital, skills 
and knowledge. But demand side dynamics affect the rate of capital accumulation 
and economic growth. Reducing nominal wages through ‘austerity’ could improve 
competitiveness, but the resulting reduced output per unit of capital will lower 
productivity and therefore the equilibrium wage, which could translate into 
lower competitiveness. The alternative wage-led growth strategy would be 
counterproductive when wages are already above the equilibrium, although they 
may be appropriate when wages are significantly below equilibrium.
The famous Rehn-Meidner rule, whereby wages ought to increase by the rate of 
inflation plus labour productivity, ignores the impact of capital productivity on 
equilibrium wages. Balanced growth would require that nominal wages be equal to 
equilibrium wages and then vary with changes in national or sectoral equilibrium 
wages. Divergences may result from broad country-specific or sector-specific 
factors, such as infrastructure, R&D, skill building and so on, but they may also 
reflect different weights of economic sectors with diverse capital–output ratios.
The equilibrium wage will increase when labour and capital productivity rise. Higher 
productivity generates more output, which can be used to remunerate workers. If 
nominal wages do not increase in line with the higher efficiency of the aggregated 
capital stock, they will fall below the equilibrium wage level and the country’s return 
on capital will rise above the euro average.
The long run supply-side conditions are related to capital productivity, the ratio 
of capital to labour and relative price effects. They depend on the international 
division of labour, skill distribution and biased technical change. In the European 
Union, an additional factor is the emergence of the central and eastern European 
countries as the main partner for the delocalisation of some stages of production.
We present empirical evidence for equilibrium and actual wage developments 
for country aggregates in section 1 and for economic sectors in section 2 (see also 
annexes). The main aggregate evidence indicates that in Germany, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, equilibrium wages have risen faster than actual wages, but in 
France and Italy the improvement of equilibrium wages has stagnated and nominal 
wages have outgrown them. Greece had moderately improved wage competitiveness 
before the crisis, but due to excessive austerity, equilibrium wages have fallen since 
then. In fact, for crisis countries, competitiveness levels do not seem to matter: 
Greece and Spain are always above the equilibrium wage, but Ireland and Cyprus are 
always below it. Portugal has improved its wage competitiveness since 2007, while 
7Italy has seen a persistent deterioration. Among the opt-out countries, Denmark 
has a stable negative wage gap, Sweden is too costly and the United Kingdom has 
gained cost advantages since the crisis. 
Table 1 shows nominal amounts of actual and equilibrium wages and their gap. In 
2015 the average monthly wage in the euro area was 3,250 euros (€); in Luxembourg 
it was €5,414, but the equilibrium level was €7,300. By contrast, in Lithuania actual 
wages were only €1,090 against the equilibrium wage of €1,803. German wages are 
in the middle with a gap of €146 below equilibrium, while Greek wages, at €1,884, 
are €512 above equilibrium. 
In the transition economies of central and eastern Europe wages are highly 
undervalued. In Romania and Poland, nominal wages are more than a third below 
their equilibrium level; but even within the euro area, Lithuania, Slovakia and 
Latvia are more competitive. Polish wages could go up on average by €579 per 
month without pushing the return on capital below the euro area. 
Wage gaps represent a competitive disequilibrium, which ought to be corrected over 
time. Unfortunately, the adjustment process is rather slow. Within the euro area, 
five countries, amounting to approximately 50 per cent of euro area GDP, are above 
equilibrium wage levels: Greece, Austria; Spain, Italy and France. Belgium, Finland 
and the Netherlands are close to equilibrium, Germany 4–5 per cent below. The 
other 10 member states – mainly in central and eastern Europe – all have massively 
undervalued wages, between 10 to 44 per cent. These wage gaps are important and 
they explain statistically the growth differentials between member states. Although 
we find that there is a tendency for the gaps to be corrected, the speed of adjustment 
is slow; on average less than 20 per cent of a given wage gap is corrected. 
2. Sectoral equilibrium wages
In this section, we enter into the core of the report and show how the competitiveness 
of the different branches of the economy can be described and analysed by using 
our definition of competitiveness; namely, the gap between actual and equilibrium 
wages. We built a dataset including 14 EU member states, covered with sectoral 
breakdowns including 30 sectors (see Appendix Figure A4.1), with 13 manufacturing 
industries, 12 service activities, two primary sectors, construction and utilities 
(electricity, gas and water). The time span covers the period 1995–2012. 
The sectoral composition of value added and the implied specialisation are 
important in explaining competitiveness patterns; in particular, the distinction 
between manufacturing and services is fundamental to understanding the 
aggregate dynamics. The manufacturing sector in Germany, Austria and in the 
eastern European member states (Slovenia and Slovakia) is important with a 
weight above 20 per cent of GDP in 2012, with some significant changes during 
the crisis (for example, in Finland). These countries form the main manufacturing 
production network of the European Union with strong vertical linkages. Due to 
the development of financial bubbles in the real estate market, the construction 
8industry had an exceptionally high share of GDP before the crisis, especially in 
Spain and Ireland. This dynamic halted and reverted after the global financial 
crisis. Figures 4–6 show that specialisation is quite varied between member states.
The ability to improve competitiveness by reducing the gaps between actual and 
equilibrium wages also depends crucially on labour market flexibility. One measure 
for estimating such flexibility is the wage spread between sectors. According to 
this measure, the northern Scandinavian countries have the most uniform wage 
levels across sectors, while the Anglo-Saxon leaning economies have the widest 
wage spreads. While this form of wage flexibility is uncorrelated with our wage gap 
levels, the more successful countries in coming out of the crisis, such as the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, have increased their sectoral 
wage differentials, while the less successful countries (Spain, Belgium, France) 
have reduced these differences. In Germany sectoral wage variety increased with 
the Hartz reforms, suggesting an additional channel though which the country has 
improved its competitiveness with regard to the rest of Europe.
In the sectoral analysis the wage gaps are calculated in two different ways: first, by 
considering the average return on capital of the available EU countries; second, by 
considering the sector-specific return on capital for the average of EU countries. 
The former is our preferred measure as it includes also the effect of changes in 
the sectoral composition of output. The data are shown in Annex A. The overall 
picture is complex, highly diversified between sectors, countries and time periods. 
The dynamics of equilibrium wages seem to reflect in part sectoral specialisation, in 
particular for Germany, Italy and Spain, whereas for France such an association is 
not clear on a descriptive level.
While equilibrium wages were calculated by using average compensation per 
employee as a benchmark, we also calculated data based on hours worked. There 
are no significant differences between these two measures in manufacturing, 
although in services the match is less precise due to the higher importance of non-
standard contractual forms of employment. This leads us to conclude that the 
analysis of labour remuneration per worker is not biased by neglected movements 
in the average number of hours worked per person employed. We therefore stick to 
the first measure as we have more complete data for this set. 
Our theory in section 1 emphasised the importance of the relative efficiency of the 
capital stock, which depends on relative price effects and technical productivity. 
Figures 8–10 decompose these effects for major sectors of the member states 
divided into before and after the crisis. The sectoral dynamics provide interesting 
explanations for the competitiveness gains in terms of rising equilibrium wages in 
the manufacturing sector. In Germany, Austria and the Netherlands this effect was 
driven by capital accumulation, whereas in the two central and eastern European 
countries (the Czech Republic and Poland) catch-up output growth explains the 
result. Since the crisis, the overall change has been fairly low, with less significant 
sectoral differences. The service sector does not seem to be particularly affected by 
important changes in the relative ACE in either period, except in Italy and Poland. 
9The section concludes with an assessment of the performance of our measure of 
equilibrium wage and wage gap in explaining changes in the sectoral composition of 
value added. We find that while there is no large difference between our equilibrium 
wage and the wage gap – that is, the deviation from the equilibrium – both these 
indicators have better explanatory power and are, in general, more significant in 
explaining the recomposition of output across sectors. This confirms that wage 
gaps are a better measure of competitiveness than the traditional real exchange 
rate measures.
3. Determinants of competitiveness
In this section we provide empirical evidence, using econometric exercises, on the 
determinants of competitiveness at sectoral level. Because our theoretical definition 
of equilibrium wages (equation 9) links competitiveness to capital intensity, capital 
productivity and relative price effects, we inquire into the determinants of these 
factors. In a first step, we focus on the capital–labour ratio and use a production 
function approach to derive an empirical specification relating capital accumulation 
to the dynamics of relative factor prices and to factor biased technical change. The 
latter is a measure of how capital intensity has changed due to technological factors 
(the bias in technical change) and to exogenous movements in factor prices. In a 
second step, we use the measure of bias in technical change as a determinant of 
equilibrium wages, together with relative price effects. In both steps we introduce 
as additional explanatory variables two proxies for the globalisation process that 
have characterised both advanced and developing countries since the start of the 
1990s: import outsourcing and export intensity. We test whether these factors 
explain the specific changes that have occurred in the different countries under our 
analysis. We find that in general 
— a rise in equilibrium wages can be the consequence of actual wage increases, 
provided they are not inflationary and cause interest rate increases; 
– a fall in the equilibrium wage may be caused by economic uncertainty and 
higher risk premiums in the interest rate;
– a rise in the equilibrium wage may be the consequence of capital-biased 
technological change; 
– to the degree that outsourcing of low-skilled labour increases capital-biased 
technological change and the capital share (see below), outsourcing increases 
equilibrium wages and incentives for ‘keeping jobs at home’ may lower the 
equilibrium wage and competitiveness.
The importance of the bias in technical change is shown in Table 14. In Germany 75 
per cent of all manufacturing sectors have shifted to more labour-saving technology, 
while in France only 25 per cent and in Spain even less. By contrast, in the service 
sector, the distribution is close to 50:50 in all countries.
Our estimates confirm recent findings in the literature on outsourcing lowering the 
K/L ratio, but they also indicate that the manufacturing and service sectors behave 
differently in all countries. We also find that the impact of inward outsourcing 
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– that is, of buying intermediary inputs abroad rather than producing them 
locally – is negative and significant in Germany and the Netherlands. While this 
effect would imply a reduction in equilibrium wages (see formula 9), the total effect 
of outsourcing on equilibrium wages depends nevertheless on its impact on capital 
productivity (see section 3.3).
We then check how the bias in technical change, relative price effects, inward 
outsourcing and export intensity affect competitiveness. The results are shown in 
Table 12 for manufacturing and in Table 13 for services, where a positive impact 
coefficient means a deterioration of competitiveness. The main results can be 
summarised as follow:
— in manufacturing, the common result is, not surprisingly, that above average 
inflation is bad for competitiveness. The only exception is Austria; 
— the inward outsourcing variable is negative and significant in Germany, 
France and Austria, leading to higher competitiveness, whereas it is positive 
in Spain, causing competitiveness losses; 
— the export intensity coefficient is positive and significant in all countries except 
Spain (where it is negative), while it is insignificant in Belgium and Finland; 
— the bias in technical change has a differentiated effect: in Germany, Spain, 
Austria and the Netherlands, it is positive, lowering competitiveness; in Italy, 
Finland and France the coefficient is negative, increasing competitiveness; 
— in the service sector (Table 13) the evidence is much weaker and we do not find 
significant associations between variables, mainly because of the heterogeneity 
of service activities and the lower effect of the two globalisation variables. 
Our results indicate that the bias in technical change, outsourcing and export 
intensity exerts a strong impact on wage competitiveness and that these effects are 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector. We also find an interesting explanation 
for the German case: 
— the outsourcing process has improved the country’s competitiveness because 
the negative effect on capital intensity is more than compensated by the 
positive effect on capital productivity; 
— on the other hand, the increased export intensity has lowered competitiveness 
because it has reduced both capital intensity and capital productivity. 
— the actual changes in these two variables suggest that the net effect is positive, 
meaning an improvement in competitiveness.
4. Policy-relevant conclusions
Our measure for equilibrium wages and competitiveness defines conditions under 
which wage increases are compatible with competitiveness. 
With regard to balanced growth in the European Union, it might be justifiable to 
accept competitive wage undervaluations in catch-up regions with low per capita 
income, but this cannot be a sustainable strategy for more advanced countries. In 
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fact, it would be reasonable to have wage levels slightly above equilibrium in rich 
countries and below it in poor countries.
Left to market forces – that is, relying on Philips-curve dynamics without deliberate 
wage policies – a correction of disequilibria is slow; a deliberate one-off wage in-
crease would generate a significant demand boom in all member states. An increase 
of 20 per cent in all those countries in which actual wages are more than 20 per cent 
below equilibrium would yield a demand stimulus of 1.9 per cent for the EU (2.1 per 
cent for the euro area) in terms of GDP and 17.6 per cent in terms of intra-EU trade.
Trade unions seek higher wages for workers. Because the margins for wage 
increases depend on the development of equilibrium wages, capital productivity, 
technological change and the transformation of an economy’s supply side, the 
process of wage bargaining must include these factors. 
Consequently, wage setting rules become more complex than the Rehn-Meidner 
rule, whereby nominal wages ought to increase at the rate that is the sum of labour 
productivity growth and inflation.
In decentralised regimes, in which wage increases reflect marginal labour 
productivity, the gap between actual and equilibrium wages can be expected to be 
minimal. By contrast, with centralised wage setting, where actual wage levels reflect 
average productivity levels – for example, in Scandinavia (see Table 5) – highly 
productive sectors will gain competitiveness at the margin, therefore attracting 
investment, which might further improve productivity. By contrast, decentralised 
wage bargaining, as in Anglo-Saxon countries, can sustain competitiveness by wage 
flexibility, but this will slow down productivity improvements and technological 
progress.
The average efficiency of capital, which is a crucial variable in explaining competi-
tiveness, depends not only on technological factors, but also on the relative prices of 
capital inputs and output relative to the euro area. In order to minimise distortions, 
economic and monetary policy ought to focus not only on the stability of average 
consumer prices, but also on regional and sectoral GDP deflators and capital goods 
prices. 
What matters most in the long run, however, is the development of capital 
productivity. The long-run factors determining sectoral and regional capital and 
labour productivity are complex and require further research. We found that 
— equilibrium wages in euro-area member states depend crucially on changes 
in the capital–labour ratio, which is dependent on the importance of relative 
factor prices (the cost of labour relative to the cost of capital) and technical 
change biases;
— actual performance in different countries varies partly because different sectors 
respond differently to changes in technological change: while technological 
progress has a tendency to affect manufacturing and services in similar ways, 
outsourcing and exports do not have the same effect;
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— wage bargaining in different sectors has to be careful to take into account the 
effects that technology and the related reorganisation of labour relations will 
have on the productivity of capital and labour.
 
This analysis is of great importance for designing a balanced growth strategy for 
Europe. There is no simple rule of thumb, although better knowledge would help 
in negotiating wage deals that generate sustainable wage increases. When nominal 
wage setting affects productivity and production functions, wage restraint can be as 
detrimental as wage exuberance. A sustainable approach would require a coherent 
economic policy approach that removes inhibitions to technological progress and 
focuses on supporting the growth of productivity in labour and capital. 
The European Commission has suggested that national governments set up 
‘National Competitiveness Boards’. However, uncoordinated national 
boards will not take into account relative competitive positions, which depend 
on the average performance of the euro area. It would be a better idea to set up 
a European Competitiveness Board, possibly in the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC), where the national social partners are already 
represented.
Introduction
Lack of international competitiveness has emerged as a prominent explanation of 
the high current account deficits and rising private and public indebtedness that are 
at the root of the euro crisis.1 The southern euro-area member states are thought to 
have overspent before the crisis and now lack competitiveness, while the northern 
member states implemented structural reforms and restrained wage increases. 
Hence, large economic imbalances have accumulated and wages are a crucial 
variable for overcoming the economic crisis which has paralysed the European 
economy for over seven years.
 
However, the role of wages is ambivalent. On one hand, they are an important 
component of production costs and therefore affect profitability and competitiveness. 
On the other hand, wages are spent on consumption and therefore affect effective 
demand. Both dimensions contribute to the volume of employment and general 
welfare. A priori it is not clear which aspect dominates.
Moreover, it is impossible to say whether wages are competitive without comparing 
the overall productive capacities of an economy. This puts wage determination in 
the context of economic growth theory. If wages are an important part of production 
costs, they must be related to the production process, technological progress and 
productivity developments. Thus, the accumulation of capital, skills and knowledge, 
innovation, R&D and the broad conditions of the legal and political environment 
will play an important role in determining the right level of wages. In other words, 
1. See European Commission (2014); Chen et al. (2013); CESifo (2013); Sinn (2013); European Commission 
(2010), Guerrieri and Esposito (2012); Flassbeck and Spiecker (2010). For a critique see Collignon (2014).
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competitiveness is not just explained by wage bargaining, but also, and maybe even 
more importantly, by the factors contributing to capital accumulation. 
This insight opens up new perspectives for determining wage strategies in the 
euro area. We will develop a method for measuring the equilibrium wage levels for 
member states and their economic sectors in the euro area. Our equilibrium wage 
is not a market clearing wage, as in models of the ‘natural rate of unemployment’ 
or the NAIRU, but the wage level at which all sectors in the euro area would be on 
a balanced growth path. 
We define ‘competitiveness’ as the relation of actual wages to equilibrium. When 
a country or economic sector operates with wages higher than the equilibrium 
level, we say it is overvalued and suffering from competitive disadvantages; by 
contrast, when wages are lower than equilibrium, the sector has a competitive 
advantage. Because the equilibrium wage is determined by productive capacities 
in a broad sense, our concept of competitiveness includes elements of non-price 
competitiveness.2 Hence, the policy implications of our approach go beyond 
structural reforms that reduce nominal and real rigidities. Our methodology allows 
us also to take a fully integrated European approach rather than falling into the trap 
of rigid and dysfunctional national labour market discussions. 
Two opposing wage strategies have been suggested in order to overcome the euro 
crisis. Mainstream orthodoxy, as defended by the European Commission, has 
argued that because the exchange rate is no longer an adjustment tool in the euro 
area, nominal wages must be reduced in order to restore competitiveness. Austerity 
policies are meant to accomplish this task.3 However, if the equilibrium wage rises, 
wage reductions are not necessary to restore competitiveness. In this case, austerity 
may actually prevent improvements in competitiveness because it not only adjusts 
domestic costs and prices relative to foreign competitors, but also depresses demand 
in the non-tradable sector, with negative effects for investment and productivity. 
Greece is a salient example of this.
Alternatively, some heterodox papers have recently suggested a strategy of wage-
led growth to overcome the effects of austerity in Europe. They have observed a 
significant correlation between the reduction in the wage share and low economic 
growth and conclude that, inversely, higher wages would increase growth and 
employment (Stockhammer 2015; Onaran and Obst 2015). However, we will show 
that when the productivity of the local capital stock remains behind the euro area 
benchmark, this reduction in local wage shares is necessary to maintain equilibrium. 
In a context in which wages are already above the equilibrium, wage-led growth 
2. ‘The differences in export performance of some Member States over the decade preceding the crisis 
are in fact difficult to explain solely on the basis of measurable price and cost considerations. Non-
price competitiveness is difficult to assess as it depends on a range of factors such as product quality 
or technological content, after-sale services or distribution services and cannot be captured in a single 
indicator. However, structural factors such as sectoral or technological specialization played a role in the 
observed divergence of Member States’ export dynamics’ (European Commission 2010: 9).
3. ‘Large losses in competitiveness combined with persistent accumulation of large current account 
deficits cannot be sustained forever and can be reversed only at the cost of protracted periods of painful 
adjustment’ (European Commission 2010: 1).
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strategies would be counterproductive, but they may be appropriate when wages 
are significantly below equilibrium. 
Hence, in order to judge correctly the role of wages in a strategy to overcome the 
euro crisis, it is necessary to assess cost competitiveness in Europe by determining 
equilibrium wages. This is the purpose of this paper.
The shortcomings of unit labour cost approaches to 
measuring competitiveness
There are many ways to measure competitiveness. International institutions 
frequently use real effective exchange rates or indices for unit labour costs (ULC).4 
However, all indices suffer from the assumption of an arbitrary base year at which 
all countries start from supposedly equal conditions. This approach ignores that 
substantial disequilibria may prevail at the moment when the index starts, so that 
the future evolution might reflect the adjustment of levels toward the equilibrium.
A typical example of the fallacious use of indices is provided by Figure 1, which 
shows the index of unit labour costs for some selected euro area member states, 
with 1999 as base year (the year when monetary union started). The thick red 
straight line represents the 2 per cent price stability target of the ECB and the blue 
curve the average performance of the euro area. There is a clear divergence in unit 
labour costs between northern and southern member states. While the average 
performance was close to the ECB target, unit labour costs have stagnated in 
Germany and exceeded the ECB target in the crisis economies. But how do we know 
whether Germany was not just correcting previous overvaluations, or whether the 
south has been catching up with euro-standards? A proper assessment must have 
an equilibrium condition against which one can evaluate actual performances. 
An index shows cumulative changes; it says nothing about the level of relative costs 
and whether they reflect an equilibrium or disequilibrium in the arbitrarily chosen 
base year. In order to circumvent the arbitrary base year problem, some economists 
have divided the unit labour costs index by a long-run average of 40 decades (see 
Wyplosz 2013). While this approach dampens the distortions, it remains an ad hoc 
and a-theoretical assumption. The proper approach would be an index that shows 
the absolute levels of relative wage cost competitiveness. 
One way to solve this problem is to derive the equilibrium from the assumption 
that in perfect markets the return on capital in a given country ought to be equal 
to the return of competitors, or, more generally, that the specific return on capital 
of a sector or country is equal to the average return for the euro area as a whole 
(see Collignon and Esposito 2014). This is, of course, only a theoretical benchmark 
and not a description of facts, but it allows measuring the handicap of attracting 
4. The usual measures are indices for real exchange rates, based on relative prices of commodities and export 
baskets converted by given exchange rates. See: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-
datasets/-/TSDEC330), OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?querytype=view&queryname=168) and 
IMF https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/pdf/basics.pdf).
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investment to particular sectors or countries. With free flow in the European market, 
capital ought to be invested where it yields the highest return, while diminishing 
returns will erase this advantage over time.
We have developed this method in previous work for calculating equilibrium unit 
labour costs in the euro area, using Eurostat and Ameco data before 2015 (Collignon 
2013); Collignon and Esposito 2014). The methodology showed differences in unit 
labour cost levels, although our calculation of nominal equilibrium unit labour 
costs was still dependent on the price index. However, with the shift of the base 
year of the GDP deflator to 2010, we found that some important inconsistencies in 
time series have emerged. 
Nevertheless, these difficulties can be circumvented when we reformulate the 
equilibrium concept for the nominal wage level and not for nominal unit labour 
costs. This is what we present in this report. It will explain the new concept and 
show how wage competitiveness depends on nominal wages and on the intricate 
dynamics of equilibrium wages. Our new formulation incorporates also a measure 
for real equilibrium unit labour costs.
The debate on wage competitiveness usually focuses on aggregate data for member 
states of the European Union. However, aggregate indices have been criticised from 
several angles. Felipe and Kumar (2011) have summarised the critique as follows: 
Figure 1 Unit labour costs index since 1999
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‘Current discussions about the need to reduce unit labor costs (especially 
through a significant reduction in nominal wages) in some countries of the 
eurozone (in particular, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) to exit 
the crisis may not be a panacea. First, historically, there is no relationship 
between the growth of unit labor costs and the growth of output. This is a well-
established empirical result, known in the literature as Kaldor’s paradox.5 
Second, construction of unit labor costs using aggregate data (standard 
practice) is potentially misleading. Unit labor costs calculated with aggregate 
data are not just a weighted average of the firms’ unit labor costs. Third, 
aggregate unit labor costs reflect the distribution of income between wages and 
profits. This has implications for aggregate demand that have been neglected.’
In this report we go beyond the determination of aggregate unit labour costs and 
shall calculate nominal equilibrium wages and a competitiveness index representing 
the ratio of actual to equilibrium labour compensation for 30 sectors in the major 
EU member states for which data are available. We will calculate two benchmark 
measures: equal return on capital with regard to the euro area and equal return on 
capital with regard to the European average of a specific sector.
In section 1, we explain the methodology behind our concept of equilibrium 
wages and present evidence for aggregate data. In section 2 we present sectoral 
data and our calculated equilibrium wage levels. Section 3 discusses factors for 
change in sectoral competitiveness and shows some econometric evidence on the 
determinants of our competitiveness measure. Section 4 concludes, drawing some 
policy conclusions.
5.  See Kaldor (1978).

1.
Calculating equilibrium
wages
1.1 Theory
We define the equilibrium wage as the level of total labour compensation, at which 
the average return on the capital stock in a given economy or in a given sector is equal 
to the average return in the euro area as a whole. The return on capital (RoC) is the 
ratio of non-wage value added relative to the historical value of the aggregate capital 
stock of a country or sector. Hence, it is the return on the capital stock before taxes. 
It can be described as the product of the capital share (which is the complement to 
the wage share 𝜎𝑘=1−𝜎𝑤) and the average efficiency of capital. The average capital 
efficiency (ACE) is measured in nominal terms, which means it is determined by a 
relative price effect, defined as the ratio of the GDP deflator P to the price deflator 
for capital goods Pk , and by capital productivity in the narrow sense as output to 
capital at constant prices. The inverse of ACE is the capital–output ratio (COR).
(1)   푅표퐶 =  푃푦−푤퐿 _푃푦  
푃푦 __  푃 푘 퐾  =  휎푘퐴퐶퐸=  (1−휎푤) 퐴퐶퐸
 
(1a)  퐴퐶퐸=   푃푦 __  푃 푘 퐾  =  1 _ 𝐶𝑂𝑅   
We also define nominal labour productivity as nominal output per person employed:
(1b) 휆=  푃푦 _퐿 
 
where Py is GDP or sectoral value added at current prices and PkK is the value of the 
accumulated capital stock at historical cost; w stands for the labour remuneration 
per worker (the ‘wage’) and L is the number of people employed.
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We can then set the equilibrium condition as:
(2) RoCxi = RoC€
(3)  (1 − 휎푤푥) 퐴퐶퐸푥=  (1 − 휎푤€) 퐴퐶퐸€
where RoCxi is the return on capital in country x for sector i, calculated as the non-
wage share of GDP or sectoral value added relative to the nominal value of the 
aggregate capital stock (ACE) and 휎푤푥 is the wage share of country x. We assume 
that the average wage share in Europe is an exogenous variable, which is true at 
least for small countries, and that it changes over time.
The equilibrium wage share of a country or sector is then: 
(4) 휎푤∗ = 1 −  (1 − 휎푤€)     
퐴퐶퐸€ _퐴퐶퐸푥
 = 1 − 휎푘€   
퐶푂푅푥 _퐶푂푅€
 
The wage share is identical to real unit labour costs,1 so that equation (4) also 
represents a country’s equilibrium real unit labour costs. Thus, if a country’s capital 
productivity is higher than the average European capital productivity, so that
 
 
 
퐴퐶퐸€
 
_
퐴퐶퐸푥 <1
 , its equilibrium wage share (and therefore its real unit labour costs) will be 
above that of the euro area. This is the same as saying that a larger share of value 
added can be used to remunerate labour because capital is more productive. We 
will see that this is consistent with skill-biased technical change, for the use of more 
productive capital equipment often requires more highly skilled operators, who will 
be paid higher wages. On the other hand, if in some countries the labour share 
has fallen over time, it may simply reflect lower capital productivity. Assuming 
equilibrium as a starting position, voluntarist increase in wages, as suggested by 
wage-led growth theorists, would only generate deviations from equilibrium and 
harm competitiveness.
Because the nominal wage w is identical to the product of nominal labour 
productivity 휆 =   
푃푦
 
_______
퐿   
 times the wage share 휎푤 =   
푤퐿
 
___
푃푦 
  , the country-specific nominal 
equilibrium wage level is:
Equilibrium wage = labour productivity 휆 x equilibrium wage share (휎푤∗): 
(5) 푤∗ = 휆휎푤∗ = 휆 − λ   (1−휎푤€)  퐴퐶퐸€  _퐴퐶퐸푥 
 = 휆  (1−휎푘€  퐶푂푅푥  _퐶푂푅€ ) 
It is clear that the equilibrium wage so defined is a function of the average wage 
share in the euro area, national or sector-specific labour productivity and the 
relative development of nominal capital productivity, that is, relative prices of goods 
and capital and the national (or sectoral) capital–output ratio relative to that of the 
1. Unit labour costs are defined as wage costs per unit of output: 푈퐿퐶 =  푤퐿  _푃푦  =  
푤  _휆  . Hence real unit labour 
costs are 푅푈퐿퐶 =  푈퐿퐶  _푃  =  
푤퐿  _푃푦  = 휎푤
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euro area. The productivity of labour and capital are related through the production 
function, as we shall discuss below.
To measure competitiveness, we will match actual labour compensation against the 
equilibrium wage. If actual wages are higher than the equilibrium wage, the return 
on capital in a particular country or industry will be lower than the euro-average. 
We interpret this as a competitive disadvantage, for lower profitability is likely to 
deter investment until the return on capital is improved, while highly competitive 
sectors and countries would attract capital and boost economic growth until over-
accumulation reduces the return. Hence, wage cost competitiveness depends on 
actual wages as they emerge from wage negotiations and on structural factors that 
shift the equilibrium wage. It also depends on the average wage share of the euro 
area; in other words, on how aggregate wages develop relative to inflation and 
productivity in the euro area as a whole. If a particular region or industry deviates 
from the average performance, it will gain or lose competitiveness. This means 
that if wage increases are slowing down in the euro area as a whole, all countries 
will have to follow suit if they wish to remain competitive. This is one reason why 
Germany as the largest economy is a trend setter for the whole of the euro area.
Our concept of equilibrium wage is important as it defines the limits for wage 
increases that are consistent for stimulating demand and pursuing a wage-led 
growth strategy. The famous Rehn-Meidner rule recommended that nominal 
wages ought to increase at the rate of productivity plus inflation, so that the wage 
share remains constant. In the euro area that has been amended to say that wage 
increases should take into account labour productivity and the inflation target of 
the ECB (see Koll 2005; European Commission 2005). However, this rule ignores 
the impact of capital productivity on equilibrium wages. Balanced growth would 
require that nominal wages be equal to equilibrium wages and then vary with 
changes in national or sectoral equilibrium wages. 
As equation (5) shows, the effect of capital productivity on equilibrium wages is 
far from trivial. Even if all countries had exactly the same rate of nominal wage 
increases in line with the Rehn-Meidner rule, their competitiveness could still be 
distorted by diverging capital productivity developments. Such divergence may be 
a consequence of broad country-specific factors, such as infrastructure, R&D, skill 
building and so on, but it may also reflect different weights of economic sectors 
with diverse capital–output ratios. For example, it is well-known that productivity 
is more likely to improve in manufacturing than in most service industries, so that 
an industrial hub such as Germany is prone to reap larger competitive advantages 
than service-intensive economies. For this reason it is important not only to analyse 
aggregate, but also sectoral equilibrium wages.
From (5) we know that the equilibrium wage will increase when labour and capital 
productivity rise. Higher capital productivity implies that the capital–output ratio 
in a given country or sector will fall faster than in the euro area as a whole. However, 
we have seen above that higher capital productivity generates more output, which 
can be used to remunerate workers. If nominal wages do not increase in line with 
the higher efficiency of the aggregated capital stock, actual wages will fall below the 
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equilibrium wage level and the country’s return on capital will rise above the euro 
average. 
This raises the question of how capital accumulation and capital efficiency affect 
labour productivity. Labour productivity can be expressed as the product of 
capital productivity and capital intensity. Thus, in order to understand what the 
determinants of competitiveness changes are, we need to investigate the reasons 
underlying changes in capital productivity and in the relative use of capital and 
labour in domestic production.
Assuming that the average wage share in Europe is an exogenous variable, the 
equilibrium wage depends on nominal labour productivity λ and on the relative 
average capital efficiency (ACE). As mentioned above, the relative ACE can be 
decomposed into the relative price effect caused by the deflators for GDP and 
capital equipment and relative capital productivity. We speak of capital efficiency 
when we refer to nominal values, which include the price effect, and we call capital 
productivity the ratio of output per unit of capital when prices are assumed to be 
constant. The decomposition assumes the following form:(6)  퐴퐶 퐸 €  ____퐴퐶 퐸 푥  =   푃 €  __ 푃 푥     푃 푘푥  __  푃 푘€      푌 €  __  퐾 €     퐾 푥  __ 푌 푥   = 푃푒푓푓 ⋅ 퐾푝푟표 푑 € ·   퐾 푥  __ 푌 푥    
where 푃푒푓푓 =   푃 €  __ 푃 푥 
    푃 푘푥  __  푃 푘€  is the combined effect of the relative GDP and capital stock’s 
deflators. By expressing nominal labour productivity as: (7) 휆 =  푃 푥   푌 푥  __  퐾 푥      퐾 푥  __ 퐿 푥 = 퐴퐶퐸   P 푘 퐾 __퐿  
we see that nominal labour productivity is related to the average capital efficiency 
(ACE) by the nominal factor intensity    P 푘 퐾 __퐿 and we obtain a definition of equilibrium 
wages depending on capital productivity and the capital–labour ratio (also called 
capital intensity): (8) 푤∗ =  푃 푥   퐾 푥  __ 퐿 푥  [  푌 푥  __  퐾 푥 −  휓 € 푃푒푓푓]  where  휓 €  = (1−  휎 푤€ ) 퐾푝푟표 푑 € 
Thus the equilibrium real wage is:(9)   푤 ∗  __ 푃​ 푥  =   퐾 푥  __ 퐿 푥  [  푌 푥  __  퐾 푥 −  휓 € 푃푒푓푓] 
Assuming for the moment constancy in prices, average euro capital productivity 
and the euro wage share, the (real) equilibrium wage will depend positively 
on the capital–labour ratio and on the country’s capital productivity. 
If the capital productivity increases, an increase in the capital intensity of 
production (higher capital/labour ratios, due, say, to automisation) will amplify the 
competitiveness effect.
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As shown in equation (7), with no change in factor intensities and constant prices, 
the two productivities are proportional and must grow at the same rate as total factor 
productivity (TFP). This is a special case in which the Rehn-Meidner rule for wage 
bargaining is valid, because capital productivity does not distort competitiveness. 
However, in general and ceteris paribus, the equilibrium real wage will increase if 
the capital intensity (K/L) increases more than the capital productivity (K/Y). This 
situation is often describes as Harrod-neutral technological progress or labour-
saving technical change.
However, factor intensities are rarely constant. The recent literature has explained 
these changes by shifts in relative factor prices and by factor-biased technical 
change or by the development of global production networks. As shown by (Timmer 
et al. 2014), since the mid-1990s global value chains have increased at a rapid pace, 
causing a change in international specialisation in terms of factor intensity. The 
authors used the World Input-Output database and matched it with the evolution 
of domestic capital and labour, with the latter further divided into low, medium 
and high skilled labour, in order to understand which factors have been favoured 
by the dis-integration of production to different countries. They find that the 
international division of production increased the use of capital and skilled labour 
and that this effect is common to all countries, not only to those abundant capital 
and skills. On the other hand, low and medium skilled labour have lost relative 
importance in production. The explanations for these findings point to the role of 
skill biased technical change (Acemoglu 2002; Autor et al. 2003) as a pervasive 
technological change in both advanced and catching-up economies. Within this 
framework, the increase in the capital share can be explained by assuming capital–
skill complementarity, meaning that skill-biased technological change is associated 
with capital-biased technological change. 
In the European context, an additional explanation is provided by the emergence 
of central and eastern European countries as main partner for the delocalisation of 
some stages of production. Given their inherited industrial structure and the skill 
composition of the workforce, the delocalisation of heavy industries and capital-
intensive stages of production has been more convenient for the countries in western 
Europe. The increase in the share of capital may also reflect the importance of 
financial capital as a means to reduce transaction costs and favour the development 
of outsourcing.
These changes at regional and global level have affected all countries, but Germany 
has benefitted relatively more from these developments due, on one hand, to 
the geographical proximity of the most advanced central and eastern European 
countries and, on the other hand, to the specialisation of the country in medium-
high tech industries – in particular, machinery and automotive – whose production 
is more easily divided between different countries. A wide literature has investigated 
the pattern of outsourcing for Germany and the other main EU countries; it has 
provided evidence that Germany has gained relatively more from outsourcing to 
central and eastern Europe in terms of productivity and export market shares (see, 
among others, Marin 2006, Guerrieri and Esposito 2012, Guerrieri and Esposito 
2013).
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In section 3 we will provide some econometric evidence on the impact of outsourcing 
and biased technical change on the relative use of capital and labour at sectoral 
level and on equilibrium wages, but first we shall present empirical evidence for 
equilibrium wages and our competitiveness index. We start with aggregate country 
data here and present sectoral data in section 2. 
1.2 Aggregated empirical evidence
Our aggregated evidence for EU member states is based on Ameco data, the sectoral 
analysis in the next chapter on Eurostat. Unfortunately, for some countries data 
are missing, usually capital stock estimates. We distinguish four country groups: 
northern euro area, southern crisis countries, new member states in the east and 
outside the euro area in the west.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of actual and equilibrium wages in selected EU 
member states. The gap between the two may be caused by excessive nominal wage 
settlements or by changes in the equilibrium wage due to variations in capital and 
labour productivity. The figure shows that the adjustment process varies significantly 
between countries. In Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, equilibrium wages 
have risen faster than actual wages, but in France and Italy the improvement of 
equilibrium wages has slowed down and nominal wages have outgrown them. 
Greece had moderately improved its wage competitiveness before the crisis, but 
since then the equilibrium wage has fallen even more rapidly than nominal wages, 
largely reflecting the negative developments in capital productivity resulting from 
insufficient use of productive capacities. Sustained lack of demand due to austerity 
has caused a slow and gradual reduction of the capital stock and potential output. 
Hence, insofar as wages are a major factor of aggregate demand, cutting wages 
is not necessarily a strategy that improves competitiveness, while slowing down 
wage increases may do so, under certain conditions.
We can condense this information into a single competitiveness indicator (Comp 
henceforth) by calculating the ratio of actual to equilibrium wages, as in Figures 
3a-3e. The horizontal line indicates a wage level at which the return on the country’s 
capital stock would be equal to the euro area average. A wage gap above 1 implies 
that wages are too high and the return on capital too low to be attractive within the 
euro area. A wage gap below 1 indicates a competitive advantage.
Among the Northern countries, Germany has eliminated an important competitive 
disadvantage in the 2000s that was inherited from unification in the early 1990s and 
it has now a nominal wage level of approximately 4 per cent below the equilibrium. 
By contrast, France has gone in the opposite direction. Finland and the Netherlands 
have lost their competitive advantage but are still below equilibrium; Austria always 
has a positive wage gap, while Belgium is usually below equilibrium. For crisis 
countries, competitiveness does not seem to matter: Greece and Spain are always 
above the equilibrium wage, which could support the view that the crisis was caused 
by lack of competitiveness, but Ireland and Cyprus are always below and still had 
a serious crisis. Portugal has improved its wage competitiveness since 2007; Italy 
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has seen a persistent tendency to lose wage competitiveness since the beginning of 
monetary union. The most consistent pattern in accordance with standard theory is 
represented by the low wage levels in the new member states, irrespective of whether 
they are inside or outside the euro. Among the opt-out countries, Denmark has a 
stable negative wage gap, Sweden is too costly and the United Kingdom has gained 
cost advantages since the crisis. Internationally, the euro area is at a disadvantage 
relative to the United States, but it has a narrowing cost advantage over Japan.
Figure 2a Actual versus equilibrium wages 
Northern euro area
Source: Authors’ elaboration on AMECO.
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Figure 2b Actual versus equilibrium wages 
Southern crisis countries
Source: Authors’ elaboration on AMECO.
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Figure 2c Actual versus equilibrium wages 
New member states
Source: Authors’ elaboration on AMECO.
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Figure 2d Actual versus equilibrium wages 
Central and eastern European countries
Source: Authors’ elaboration on AMECO.
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Figure 2e Actual versus equilibrium wages 
Non-Euro area countries
Source: Authors’ elaboration on AMECO.
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Figure 3a Competitiveness index in the old euro area members
Northern Euro Area
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Figure 3b Competitiveness index in the old euro area members
Crisis coutries
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Figure 3c Competitiveness index in the old euro area members
New Member States
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Figure 3d Competitiveness index (Comp) in the old euro area members
Central and Eastern Europe
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Figure 3e Competitiveness index (Comp) in the old euro area members
Opt out and extra-EU countries
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Table 1 shows actual and equilibrium wages before and after the Lehman crisis, as 
well as the wage gap in absolute euro amounts and as a percentage of equilibrium. 
In 2015 the average monthly wage in the euro area was €3,250, in Luxembourg it 
was €5,414 but the equilibrium level was €7,300. By contrast, in Lithuania actual 
wages were only €1,090 against the equilibrium wage of €1,803. German wages are 
in the middle with a gap of €146 below equilibrium, while Greek wages, at €1,884, 
are €512 above equilibrium. In the Non-Euro Area wages are undervalued in all 
countries except Sweden. On average the relative wage gap is higher because of the 
larger weight of the transition economies in central and eastern Europe. In Romania 
and Poland, nominal wages are more than a third below their equilibrium level, 
but even within the euro area Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia are more competitive. 
Polish wages could go up on average by €579 per month without pushing the return 
on capital below the euro area average. Among the old opt-out member states, the 
United Kingdom and Denmark have gained significant competitive advantages, 
while Sweden has reduced its cost disadvantage. In the United Kingdom, monthly 
wages could go up by €356 and in Denmark even by €685, but in Sweden they 
would have to fall by €180. Note that Denmark has a fixed exchange rate to the 
euro, but the United Kingdom and Sweden do not. 
Within the euro area, five countries – amounting to approximately 50 per cent 
of euro-area GDP – are above equilibrium wage levels: Greece, Austria; Spain, 
Italy and France. In Italy and France, wages are a bit more than 2 per cent above 
equilibrium levels, while in Germany wages are 4.2 per cent below equilibrium, 
with a falling trend. Portugal and Ireland have benefitted from very low wage costs. 
Greece had reduced its comparative disadvantage significantly before the crisis, but 
due to the adverse effects of austerity, the equilibrium wage has fallen more rapidly 
than actual wages, so that Greek actual wages are now 37.3 per cent per cent above 
equilibrium. It is clear that closing such a wage gap cannot be done by nominal 
wage cuts but requires changes in productivity. 
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Table 1 Average monthly wage in € 000
 
European Union
Euro area (18)
Luxembourg
Belgium
Finland
Ireland
Netherlands
France
Austria
Germany
Italy
Spain
Slovenia
Greece
Cyprus
Malta
Portugal
Estonia
Slovakia
Latvia
Lithuania
unweighted mean
standard deviation
Denmark
United Kingdom
Sweden
Croatia
Czech Republic
poland
Hungary
Romania
Bulgaria
unweighted mean
standard deviation
United States
Japan
 
1999
2045
2310
3398
3072
2526
2329
2568
2616
2592
2565
2240
1833
1189
1369
1384
1095
1207
379
350
308
315
1754
993
2854
2632
2359
800
463
520
474
162
166
1159
1115
3371
3408
 
2007
2613
2801
4584
3829
3236
3724
3278
3313
3093
2787
2759
2370
1769
2068
1890
1514
1621
1056
888
876
833
2394
1122
3771
3675
3122
1289
1049
821
1038
594
317
1742
1375
3488
2354
 
2015
2983
3250
5414
4490
3396
3896
3841
3834
3656
3316
3035
2655
2102
1884
1868
1858
1732
1476
1302
1132
1090
2736
1254
4520
3789
3782
1427
1222
1048
1000
681
575
2005
1555
4857
2707
 
1999
2016
2310
4900
2955
2730
2975
2556
2791
2287
2348
2537
1774
1376
890
1813
1395
1217
454
517
450
396
1914
1163
3190
2615
2098
815
481
607
617
181
208
1201
1126
3643
2879
 
2007
2643
2801
6363
3876
3527
4483
3432
3348
2866
2828
2888
2052
2079
1623
2469
2060
1574
1317
1542
1457
1214
2684
1300
4112
3687
2922
1452
1267
1232
1375
829
491
1930
1303
3712
2129
 
2015
3083
3250
7300
4545
4010
5235
3882
3757
3249
3461
2967
2558
2331
1372
2595
2550
1924
1673
2223
2029
1803
3130
1448
5205
4145
3602
1495
1525
1627
1421
1038
659
2302
1593
5788
2365
 
1999-2007
27.8%
21.3%
34.9%
24.6%
28.1%
59.9%
27.6%
26.6%
19.3%
8.7%
23.2%
29.3%
48.8%
51.1%
36.6%
38.3%
34.3%
178.6%
153.7%
184.4%
164.4%
61.7%
59.0%
32.1%
39.6%
32.3%
61.1%
126.6%
57.9%
119.0%
266.7%
91.0%
91.8%
74.5%
3.5%
-30.9%
 
2007-2015
14.2%
16.0%
18.1%
17.3%
4.9%
4.6%
17.2%
15.7%
18.2%
19.0%
10.0%
12.0%
18.8%
-8.9%
-1.2%
22.7%
6.8%
39.8%
46.6%
29.2%
30.9%
16.9%
13.5%
19.9%
3.1%
21.1%
10.7%
16.5%
27.6%
-3.7%
14.6%
81.4%
21.3%
24.5%
39.2%
15.0%
Average monthly wage = annual nominal compensation (HWCDW) per employees (NWTD)/12 
Source: Own elaboration on AMECO.
Gross wage 
(monthly, €)
Change  
(%)
Equilibrium wage  
(monthly, €)
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1999
29000
0
-1502000
117000
-204000
-646000
12000
-175000
305000
217000
-297000
59000
-187000
479000
-429000
-300000
-10000
-75000
-167000
-142000
-81000
-159263
415536
-336000
17000
261000
-15000
-18000
-87000
-143000
-19000
-42000
-42444
156439
-272000
529000
 
2007
-30000
0
-1779000
-47000
-291000
-759000
-154000
-35000
227000
-41000
-129000
318000
-310000
445000
-579000
-546000
47000
-261000
-654000
-581000
-381000
-290000
490696
-341000
-12000
200000
-163000
-218000
-411000
-337000
-235000
-174000
-187889
187346
-224000
225000
 
2015
-100000
0
-1886000
-55000
-614000
-1339000
-41000
77000
407000
-145000
68000
97000
-229000
512000
-727000
-692000
-192000
-197000
-921000
-897000
-713000
-394053
603087
-685000
-356000
180000
-68000
-303000
-579000
-421000
-357000
-84000
-297000
268770
-931000
342000
 
1999
1.4%
0.0%
-30.7%
4.0%
-7.5%
-21.7%
0.5%
-6.3%
13.3%
9.2%
-11.7%
3.3%
-13.6%
53.8%
-23.7%
-21.5%
-0.8%
-16.5%
-32.3%
-31.6%
-20.5%
-8.1%
20.4%
-10.5%
0.7%
12.4%
-1.8%
-3.7%
-14.3%
-23.2%
-10.5%
-20.2%
-7.9%
11.1%
-7.5%
18.4%
 
2007
-1.1%
0.0%
-28.0%
-1.2%
-8.3%
-16.9%
-4.5%
-1.0%
7.9%
-1.4%
-4.5%
15.5%
-14.9%
27.4%
-23.5%
-26.5%
3.0%
-19.8%
-42.4%
-39.9%
-31.4%
-11.1%
18.5%
-8.3%
-0.3%
6.8%
-11.2%
-17.2%
-33.4%
-24.5%
-28.3%
-35.4%
-16.9%
14.8%
-6.0%
10.6%
 
2015
-3.2%
0.0%
-25.8%
-1.2%
-15.3%
-25.6%
-1.1%
2.0%
12.5%
-4.2%
2.3%
3.8%
-9.8%
37.3%
-28.0%
-27.1%
-10.0%
-11.8%
-41.4%
-44.2%
-39.5%
-12.0%
20.4%
-13.2%
-8.6%
5.0%
-4.5%
-19.9%
-35.6%
-29.6%
-34.4%
-12.7%
-17.1%
14.0%
-16.1%
14.5%
 
1999-2007
31.1%
21.3%
29.9%
31.2%
29.2%
50.7%
34.3%
20.0%
25.3%
20.4%
13.8%
15.7%
51.1%
82.4%
36.2%
47.7%
29.3%
190.1%
198.3%
223.8%
206.6%
70.3%
73.2%
28.9%
41.0%
39.3%
78.2%
163.4%
103.0%
122.9%
358.0%
136.1%
119.0%
101.2%
1.9%
-26.1%
 
2007-2015
16.6%
16.0%
14.7%
17.3%
13.7%
16.8%
13.1%
12.2%
13.4%
22.4%
2.7%
24.7%
12.1%
-15.5%
5.1%
23.8%
22.2%
27.0%
44.2%
39.3%
48.5%
18.8%
14.7%
26.6%
12.4%
23.3%
3.0%
20.4%
32.1%
3.3%
25.2%
34.2%
20.0%
11.5%
55.9%
11.1%
Change 
(%)
Wage gap   
(€)
Wage gap   
(%)
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Wage gaps represent a competitive disequilibrium, which ought to be corrected 
over time. In Table 2, we show the result of a simple econometric exercise in which 
the change in the competitiveness indicator – that is, the wage gap – is regressed on 
its level in the previous period for the EMU countries. The result indicates that the 
adjustment process is rather slow, on average less than 20 per cent of the wage gap 
is corrected in Europe each year.
In a second exercise, we regress deviation of GDP growth rates from the EMU 
average on the initial wage gap and per capita log-GDP. The results (Table 2 lower 
panel) indicate that wage gaps are important and provide an explanation for the 
different paces of growth and the different performances in overcoming the crisis. 
The deviation of growth rates is negatively correlated with the wage gap (ratio of 
actual to equilibrium wages) and with per capital income levels. In other words, 
competitive wages accelerate the catch-up of low-income countries.
However, as already pointed out, the aggregate data may hide very different 
dynamics in production sectors. We turn therefore to a sectoral analysis of European 
wage dynamics.
Table 2 Adjustment of wage gap and adjustment of relative GDP growth rates
Dependent variable: change in the wage GAP (DComp where D=∆)
Comp t-1
Dependent variable: deviation of GDP growth from the EMU average
Comp t-1
-0.180***
[0.028]
-0.139***
[0.043]
R2=0.07
log(GDPpc)t-1 R2=0.35 Obs 361
Obs 361
-0.093***
[0.010]
2.
Sectoral equilibrium wages
In the previous section we introduced the theoretical concept of the equilibrium 
wage as the wage level that would allow the return on capital in a country to be equal 
to the EMU average. We also showed evidence based on aggregate data in order to 
highlight the additional information provided by the levels of our measure with 
regard to the standard indicators, which assess only the competitive performance 
over time. In this section, we enter into the core of the report and show how the 
competitiveness of the different branches of the economy can be described and 
analysed by using our definition of competitiveness; that is, the gap between actual 
and equilibrium wages. 
Analyses at sectoral level find the main constraint in the availability of a 
comprehensive dataset for all sectors over a fairly long time period. A major 
effort has been made to collect and assemble data from different sources in order 
to calculate the measure described in section 1 for a period including also the 
years following the global financial crisis. The description of the construction of 
the database is provided in section 2.1. The next step is to provide a description 
of the evolution of the different sectors in terms of shares in value added and 
specialisation with regard to the European average and compare such evolution 
with that of our competitiveness measure in order to identify a possible relationship 
between sectoral competitiveness and the dynamics of specialisation in production 
and trade. This evidence is provided in sections 2.2 and 2.3. At this stage, we pay 
particular attention to two issues: first, the use of average wage per person employed 
versus wage per hour worked (section 2.4); second, the role of the relative average 
capital efficiencies of the countries with regard to the European average (section 
2.5). Finally, in section 2.6 we test the performance of our indicator in explaining 
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changes in the sectoral composition of value added against the standard measure of 
cost competitiveness, namely unit labour costs.
2.1  The data set
We collected data at NACE (rev.2) level for the major 14 EU member states, namely: 
the euro area as a whole – Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherland, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. The 
sectoral breakdown originally included 38 sectors but due to missing data for 
some disaggregated sectors, in particular in services, we aggregated some branches 
to obtain a final breakdown of 30 sectors (see Appendix Figure A4.1), with 13 
manufacturing industries, 12 service activities, two primary sectors, construction 
and utilities (electricity, gas and water). The time span covers the period 1995–2012. 
We collected wage data (average compensation per employee) and a number of 
variables in order to build the equilibrium wage as defined in equation (5). Labour 
productivity is defined as the ratio of GDP at constant prices and employment; 
as measure of price dynamics, we use the GDP deflator. These data are from the 
Eurostat National Accounts Database. 
In order to calculate the return on capital for each sector we use the sectoral capital 
stock provided by the OECD-STAN database, which contains data for 13 European 
countries from the end of the 1990s to 2011. The countries for which sectoral capital 
stock data are available are shown in Table 4. In order to maximise the coherence 
between OECD and Eurostat data, we used the former and calculated the capital 
stock by multiplying the capital output ratio derived from OECD by the Eurostat’s 
real GDP series.
For some countries (see Table 3), the data coverage of capital stock data does not 
include the years since the crisis. For this reason, and in order to obtain data for 
the following period matching wage data, we integrated the dataset by using an 
econometric procedure. More specifically, we took data for gross fixed capital 
formation and consumption of fixed capital, both available from the Eurostat 
Database, and applied a recursive regression approach where the capital stock at 
time t is estimated for each country using the following equation:
(10) 푙표푔 퐾 𝑖, 𝑡 = 훼 + 휌 퐾 𝑖, 𝑡−1 +  훽 1 푙표푔퐺퐹퐶 퐹 𝑖, 𝑡 +  훽 2 푙표푔퐶퐹 퐶 𝑖, 𝑡 +  훽 3 푙표푔퐺퐷 푃 𝑖, 𝑡 +  훾 𝑖 +  휃 𝑡 +  휀 𝑖, 𝑡 
Where K is the capital stock at constant prices, GFCF is gross fixed investment, 
CFC is the consumption of fixed capital and GDP is Gross Domestic Product. The 
model is estimated though the two-way fixed effects estimator (FE) where ϒ and ϴ 
represent the individual and time specific fixed effects. The capital stock is obtained 
by estimating equation (10) recursively and by using in each step the forecast 
capital stock of the first missing period. The capital stock at current prices is then 
obtained by multiplying the series at constant prices by the price deflator of the 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Table 4 shows the data coverage and the years for 
which econometric estimates were used.
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The use of capital stock data from OECD, as well as the imputation procedure return 
satisfactory results. This can be verified in particular by looking at the estimates of 
the equilibrium wage (Appendix 2) and capital productivity (Appendix 4) for the 
total economy, which return similar results to those shown in section 1. There are, 
however, some discrepancies between the totals calculated using AMECO data and 
those obtained by merging OECD and Eurostat data. This is due in part to the fact 
that we are using different sources and in part to the occasional use of econometric 
estimates to replace missing real data. An additional source of discrepancy comes 
from the fact that the European averages are calculated using only the 12 European 
countries for which data were available, namely, eight euro area countries and 
four EU countries not belonging to the EA18, whereas data shown in the previous 
chapter use the EA18 averages to calculate the benchmark return on capital. 
2.2 Some descriptive evidence
In order to understand the importance of the different sectors in European countries, 
a broad picture is reported in Table 4, which gives the sectoral distribution of 
value added according to the standard division between manufacturing, services, 
construction and other sectors (including agriculture, mining and quarrying, 
electricity, gas and water supply). The main difference between countries lies in the 
high importance of the manufacturing sector in Germany, Austria and in the central 
and eastern European member states (Slovenia and Slovakia), where the share 
is above 20 per cent. These countries form the main production network of the 
European Union because of their strong vertical linkages. A distinguishing feature 
of some countries was the high share of construction in GDP before the crisis, due 
to the development of real estate bubbles, especially in Spain and Ireland, and the 
catch up process in most of the New Member States. In many cases this has changed 
since the global financial crisis.
Table 3 Summary of capital stock data availability and imputation
 
Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Norway
Spain
UK
Classification
Nace Rev-3
Nace Rev-4
Nace Rev-4
Nace Rev-4
Nace Rev-4
Nace Rev-3
Nace Rev-4
Nace Rev-3
Nace Rev-4
Nace Rev-3
Nace Rev-4
Nace Rev-3
Nace Rev-3
Data coverage
1995–2007
1995–2011
1995–2011
1995–2012
1995–2011
1995–2008
1995–2010
1995–2007
1995–2011
2004–2008
1995–2011
2000–2009
1995–2008
Imputation
2008–2012
2012
2012
None
2012
2009–2012
2011–2012
2008–2012
2012
2009–2012
2012
2010–2012
2009–2012
Source: OECD STAN and authors’ elaboration.
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A more detailed picture comes from the sectoral distribution of value added (Figures 
4a-4b). We have ordered the importance of the 30 sectors for each country according 
to their shares in value added in percentage terms. In the main countries of the 
euro area, finance, trade and professional services account for the highest share of 
value added. This is true in particular in France where the three sectors account for 
almost 40 per cent of GDP and manufacturing experienced a strong fall in relative 
terms between 2000 and 2008. In the other three countries manufacturing is more 
important and it has kept its share basically constant in Germany and Italy. In Spain 
the construction sector, even after the bursting of the real estate bubble, accounts 
for 10 per cent of GDP. Among manufacturing industries, we can see the strong 
importance of food and beverages in France and Spain, electronics and machinery 
in Germany, metals and textiles in Italy and Spain.
Table 4 Economic structure for the macro-sectors (%)
 
Belgium
Germany
Estonia
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Portugal
Slovenia
Slovakia
Finland
 
Manuf.
17.0
23.3
15.9
9.2
13.5
12.7
17.7
11.5
17.7
9.3
13.3
20.5
18.8
14.1
23.3
23.2
25.3
 
Serv.
73.9
68.8
65.7
76.6
71.1
77.1
71.4
72.0
63.2
83.0
74.4
67.6
63.7
73.3
62.7
57.9
62.3
 
Constr.
5.4
3.9
10.6
6.8
10.1
6.1
6.0
9.7
11.2
5.5
5.6
6.9
7.7
6.8
8.0
8.3
6.7
 
Other
3.7
4.1
7.7
7.3
5.3
4.1
4.9
6.8
7.9
2.2
6.7
5.1
9.8
5.8
6.0
10.6
5.7
 
Manuf.
14.5
22.6
16.1
8.1
12.1
11.4
15.0
12.9
20.7
5.6
12.2
18.7
18.0
14.1
21.6
21.0
16.9
 
Serv.
76.2
68.4
67.0
82.5
76.2
78.2
74.2
72.5
64.9
86.1
75.9
70.0
63.9
73.3
66.1
61.1
70.2
 Constr.
5.7
4.5
7.5
2.6
5.8
6.1
5.5
6.1
5.9
5.5
4.8
6.2
7.6
6.8
5.8
8.9
6.6
 
Other
3.5
4.4
9.4
6.8
6.0
4.3
5.3
8.5
8.5
2.9
7.1
5.1
10.5
5.8
6.5
9.0
6.3
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat.
2007 2012
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Figure 4a Distribution of value added in the main EMU countries1
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1. For the abbreviations of the sectors, please consult the list at page 142.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat.
Figure 5 Specialisation indexes for the main EMU countries
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Figure 4b Distribution of value added in the main EMU countries
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The previous figures indicate that there are different specialisation patterns among 
the main EMU countries. This is made clearer in Figures 5 and 6, in which we show 
an index of specialisation as the share of sectors in different countries with regard to 
the euro area average. A value above 1 indicates specialisation, whereas values below 
1 indicate that the country is less specialised in a specific sector. France is relatively 
specialised in R&D, ICT services, health, education and other transport equipment 
(mainly aircraft), whereas it is less oriented toward textiles, machinery and motor 
vehicles. The latter two are the sectors in which Germany is mostly specialised. The 
Italian economy is traditionally specialised in textiles and has further increased its 
specialisation over the past decade, although due to the development of outsourcing 
and increasing competition from low-wage countries, the share of this industry fell 
in Italy, as well as in the rest of Europe. Other important industries are mechanical 
engineering and food and beverages. Interestingly, Italy is least specialised in the 
manufacturing of motor vehicles and has experienced a further de-specialisation 
over time. Tourism, construction and agriculture are the main strength of the Spanish 
model, whereas we see a below average importance of high tech manufacturing 
(machinery and electronics) and knowledge-intensive services.
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Turning to the main EU countries outside the EMU (Figure 6), Poland is highly 
specialised in the primary sector and especially in mining and quarrying and the 
energy sector, as well as in low tech branches, such as food and beverages and trade 
and repairs. On the other side, the country is least specialised in some high tech 
branches, such as pharmaceuticals, ICT services and machinery. The production of 
motor vehicles is becoming increasingly important, reaching an index value of 1 in 
2011 from 0.5 in 2000. The main changes over time are the loss of importance of 
the textile industry and the increased specialisation in mining, coke and petroleum 
products, electricity and gas. Finally, in the United Kingdom, mining and quarrying 
is the branch with the highest value in the specialisation index, although its level fell 
from 2000 to 2011. The weight of finance is above the European average, although 
less than one might expect. The manufacturing of other transport equipment and 
ICT services are also highly represented in the country. Most of the other services 
show an index of around 1, whereas the country appears to be unspecialised 
in manufacturing. Over time, the most significant changes are the increased 
Figure 6 Specialisation indexes for Poland and the United Kingdom
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specialisation in pharmaceuticals, for which the index doubled from 2000 and 
2011, and in finance. The major loss of specialisation is recorded for chemicals, 
electronics, food and beverages and R&D.
To sum up, the evolution of relative specialisation indicates that France is becoming 
a post-industrial country, specialising in knowledge-intensive services, which might 
justify the loss of importance of manufacturing. This dynamic appears similar 
to that of the United Kingdom. Germany is specialised in medium and high tech 
manufacturing, whereas services – especially knowledge-intensive ones – are of 
much lower importance. Italy seems to be maintaining its traditional model based on 
the principle ‘Made in Italy’ and on capital-intensive manufacturing. Spain is more 
intensively specialised in non-tradables, whereas knowledge-intensive services 
are of little importance. Hence, while Germany and France seem to show models 
that might compete successfully in the world economy, the two southern European 
countries – especially Spain – would have to change their production structure in 
order to face the competition of both advanced and emerging economies. Among 
the latter, the role of Poland as supplier of low-tech and resource-intensive goods 
is dominant.
This preliminary evidence does not, however, say much about the real competitiveness 
of the sectors in which the countries are specialised. More detailed conclusions 
can be drawn from the joint analysis of wage development and profitability of the 
different industries by using the definition of equilibrium wages in section 1. 
2.3 Sectoral equilibrium wages
The next step is the calculation of sectoral equilibrium wages. The relative figures for 
the countries with available data for the capital stock are reported in the Appendix 
1. Each figure reports data for 28 sectors, for manufacturing as a whole and for the 
total economy. We exclude only some small sectors whose dynamics are not related 
to those of wages and competitiveness as we define it. In some cases, we exclude also 
the manufacturing of coke and petroleum products and of mining and quarrying, 
because they are dependent mainly on factor endowment and international prices of 
commodities. We already stressed that due to the discrepancies in the data sources 
there are some slight differences with regard to the aggregate measures calculated 
using AMECO, but the overall picture is unchanged. 
In each figure we report the dynamics of actual wages (compensation per employee) 
and two equilibrium measures. We use alternatively the aggregate return for the 
euro area capital stock and the sector-specific return on capital in the euro area. 
These two equilibrium levels indicate whether the actual wage level in a given sector 
is competitive with regard to the euro area as a whole, or only with regard to the 
sector itself. Competitiveness relative to the euro area ought to attract investment 
and accelerate growth at the expense of other sectors. Lack of competitiveness 
within a sector would cause delocalisation and outsourcing within a given industry. 
The number beside the sector name in the title of each chart reports the sector’s 
average share in value added in order to give an indication of its relative importance.
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Competitiveness is often related to labour market flexibility. There are many 
measures for estimating such flexibility, but one of them is the wage spread between 
sectors. This can be measured by the coefficient of variation across sectoral wages 
(see Table 5).2 We have ordered wage flexibility by the size of the coefficient and 
it appears that the northern Scandinavian countries have the most uniform wage 
levels across sectors, while the Anglo-Saxon-leaning economies have wider wage 
spreads. While this form of wage flexibility is uncorrelated with the wage gap 
levels in Table 5,3 it is interesting that countries that have been more successful in 
coming out of the crisis – such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and 
the Netherlands – have increased their sectoral wage differentials, while the less 
successful countries (Spain, Belgium, France) have reduced these differences. In 
Germany the greater sectoral wage variety increased with the Hartz reforms. Some 
service sectors have seized on the low contractual power of ‘self-employed’ workers 
with atypical wage contracts and lower or no union coverage.
We can summarise the main evidence on sectoral actual and equilibrium wages as 
follows. In Germany (Figure A1.7) wages became undervalued around 2007, but the 
competitive advantage in manufacturing started already at the end of the 1990s and 
continued to improve over the whole period due to moderate wage increases relative 
to the growth of equilibrium wages. Such a gain is common to most of German manu-
facturing sectors, in particular the medium-high tech ones. Lower gains are recorded 
in the food and textile industries and in the manufacturing of transport equipment. 
As for the service sector, the picture is partially reversed: there is a competitive 
advantage only in telecommunications (from 2005), trade and repairs (from 2003) 
and professional services, while strong disadvantages exist in transports, finance, 
education, arts and entertainments and – since 2001 – in ICT services.
2. The coefficient of variation is the ratio between the sectoral standard deviation and the average wage.
3. The coefficient of correlation is –0.016.
Table 5 Coefficient of variation of wages across sectors
 
Finland
Denmark
Norway
Italy
Poland
Czech Republic
Germany
Austria
Spain
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Estonia
UK
2000
0.2
0.22
0.29
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.47
0.52
0.42
0.38
0.44
0.43
0.90
2007
0.22
0.26
0.30
0.34
0.39
0.35
0.4
0.43
0.58
0.44
0.41
0.51
0.54
1.24
2011
0.23
0.3
0.33
0.34
0.34
0.35
0.42
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.48
0.59
1.66
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data.
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This picture is in line with many explanations for German competitiveness. 
Manufacturing has benefitted from fairly centralised wage bargaining, which 
has ensured that wages grow at similar rates across the economy, while capital 
productivity varies substantially between sectors. Skill biased technical change 
and outsourcing have increased the average efficiency of the capital stock in 
manufacturing (see section 2.4), while the service sector has created low wage/low 
value-added jobs (the mini-jobs) in sectors with low productivity increases. 
For Italy (Figure A1.8) we have already documented the constant aggregate 
competitive loss from the mid-1990s to 2012. In manufacturing the country 
experienced a similar loss, but its wages are only slightly overvalued with regard to 
the average return on capital, while losing substantially in terms of sector-specific 
return on capital. This dynamic is common to most manufacturing industry and it is 
due mainly to the weakness of capital productivity and the consequential reduction 
of equilibrium wages starting in the past few years. The manufacturing of transport 
equipment has been most affected, together with wood and paper and rubber and 
plastic products. Electronics, and to a lesser extent textiles, retain a certain degree 
of competitiveness with regard to sector-specific return on capital. As for the service 
sector, there is a competitive advantage in health and care, arts and entertainments, 
finance and transport, while a strong overvaluation affects professional services 
and almost an equilibrium, although only with regard to sector-specific return on 
capital, in R&D activities.
France (Figure A1.6) experienced a moderate undervaluation due to its ‘franc 
fort’ policies in the 1990s, but this advantage had been constantly eroded up to 
the global financial crisis. In manufacturing there is still a competitive advantage, 
although actual wage dynamics, in particular after the introduction of the euro, have 
been more pronounced than that of equilibrium wages. The advantage is eroding 
in particular in the pharmaceutical industry and in machinery. The reduction of 
equilibrium wages is due in particular to the low capital productivity (see Figure 
A2.7). Unfortunately, due to missing data for the capital stock, we do not have a 
complete picture of manufacturing industry. 
Utilities and constructions are also undervalued, whereas in services we observe a 
mixed situation. On one hand, we observe a strong and increasing overvaluation in 
finance and professional services, which account for almost 30 per cent of GDP; on 
the other hand, telecommunications, trade and repairs, as well as health care are 
still highly competitive. The remaining sectors had a position between these two 
extremes, particularly R&D, tourism and education. 
The Spanish case is peculiar (Figure A1.12). On average, the country has been 
strongly overvalued over the whole period. Manufacturing was overvalued with 
regard to its specific return on capital, whereas it is still undervalued with regard 
to the euro average because of the high overvaluation in services. The pattern in 
manufacturing is common to most industries, while the most recent data indicate 
a gain in the chemical industry and mixed dynamics in machinery, although 
both sectors are relatively small. Utilities still seem to be competitive, and so is 
construction. Some services, such as tourism (accommodation and food services), 
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followed by education and health care are also undervalued, whereas the remaining 
branches show a strong and increasing overvaluation. Given the high share of 
immigrant labour, one would expect the competitiveness in construction and 
tourism to be based on low-skilled low-wage migrant workers. 
Among the other euro area countries, the Netherlands’ (Figure A1.8) total economy 
is slightly overvalued but the manufacturing sector has become undervalued 
after the global financial crisis due in particular to motor vehicles, machinery, 
textile and chemicals. In services – except for finance and R&D – we observe a 
general undervaluation, in particular in trade, tourism, telecommunications and 
professional services. Austria is close to Germany in terms of competitive dynamics, 
with an undervalued manufacturing sector.
Calculating equilibrium wages for non-euro area countries involves the exchange 
rate. As a consequence, actual and equilibrium wages, expressed in euros, are more 
volatile (but note that Denmark has fixed its exchange rate to the euro, although 
the relationship between the wage series remains stable). The wage gap will be 
affected only to the degree that currency devaluations generate higher exports with 
larger profit content. Thus, the greater volatility of equilibrium wages in the United 
Kingdom (Figure A1.12) reflects movements in the exchange rate with the euro. 
Manufacturing is in equilibrium with regard to its specific return on capital, but in 
general we see a close correlation between equilibrium and actual wages and similar 
tendencies in most of the sector, with both measures falling from the second half of 
the past decade due probably to exchange rate appreciation. It is worth mentioning 
that transport and storage became overvalued after the introduction of the euro, 
whereas the financial sector became undervalued after the global financial crisis.
In the member states of central and eastern Europe, we lack data on capital stock, 
which prevents us from calculating sectoral equilibrium wages, except for the Czech 
Republic and Poland. The former, with few exceptions, shows similar levels and 
growth rates in actual and equilibrium wages, remaining consequently close to the 
equilibrium. Motor vehicles, a sector that has attracted a lot of German outsourcing 
investment, appears to be the most competitive industry; among services, ICT and 
professional services are undervalued, whereas finance is strongly overvalued. 
Poland is strongly undervalued in manufacturing and in most service activities. The 
main exception is in the primary sector, which accounts for more than 4 per cent of 
GDP and is strongly overvalued.
To sum up, the dynamics of equilibrium wages and the implied wage gap seem 
to reflect in part the pattern of sectoral specialisation, in particular for Germany, 
Italy and Spain whereas for France such an association is not clear on a descriptive 
level. More information will come from the econometric analysis at the end of the 
chapter.
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2.4 Compensation per employee or compensation per hours 
worked ?
In all the previous analyses, equilibrium wages were calculated by using the average 
compensation per employee as a benchmark because that allows us to maximise 
the data coverage. The main drawback is that it can hide movements in the number 
of hours worked per employee. Several factors affect the difference between the 
evolution of the number of employed persons and that of hours worked. First of 
all, it does not take into account the role of part-time workers, whose numbers 
have increased over time, making the number of employees a poor indicator for the 
amount of labour used in production. Other problems related to this measure are, 
on one hand, the reduction in working time which has taken place in most advanced 
countries since the mid-1990s and, on the other, the use of short-run automatic 
stabilisers such as the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni in Italy and short-time working 
in Germany. The latter was particularly important during the global financial crisis. 
Some countries also used it to reduce the social costs of the recession in the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Statistically, this means that employment calculated in terms 
of persons did not fall as much as the number of hours worked because workers in 
these programmes appear to be employed but with fewer or zero hours worked. At 
the same time, labour remuneration is not counted as a ‘wage’ but as a state social 
benefit. Both factors induce distortions in the calculation of average wages and of 
the actual use of labour. This problem shows up mainly in the service sector where 
flexible working contracts are common, whereas in manufacturing employment 
tends to be in the permanent full-time contract form. The figures in Annex 3 show 
actual and equilibrium wages for selected countries based on hours worked. As 
we can see, the data confirm that the differences between the two measures are 
fairly small in manufacturing, whereas in the service sector, some branches show 
significant divergences between the two measures. This is true in particular in health 
care services, trade and repairs, education and professional services, whereas in 
other branches such as public administration, R&D and telecommunications the 
differences between the two measures are relatively small. 
Overall, then, we can conclude that the use of data based on the number of persons 
employed does not cause major biases in the analysis when we consider the 
manufacturing sector. In the case of services, by contrast, the approximation is less 
precise. For this reason, we will show them in the following chapter as a robustness 
check when the data availability allows us to run the econometric analyses with 
hourly measures. 
2.5 Capital prices and capital productivity
Our theory explains that equilibrium wages and competitiveness are strongly 
influenced by the average efficiency of capital (ACE) stocks. In Figures 7 to 9 we 
show the decomposition of the relative ACE effect, as described in equation (6), for 
the main sectors of the member state economies during the periods 1999–2007 and 
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2008–2011.4 Each variable is expressed in such a way that an increase leads to an 
increase in the relative ACE component and, hence, to a reduction in equilibrium 
wages. The macro-sectors are: agriculture, mining and quarrying (AMQ), con-
struction (Constr), electricity, gas and water supply (EGW), manufacturing (Manuf) 
and services (Serv). Due to missing data for some service activities, the aggregation 
of the five macro-sectors might lead to slightly different results with regard to the 
data for the total economy. 
Figure 7 shows the decomposition for the four biggest members of the euro area. 
In France the total effect was slightly positive (below 1 per cent) between 1999 
and 2007, with the main contributions coming from the primary sector, services 
and manufacturing. In the latter, the positive GDP deflator effect (p€–p) has been 
almost entirely compensated by the negative effect of capital accumulation. Similar 
dynamics are shown for EGW, while in agriculture the relative growth effect (y€–y) 
added to this pattern, resulting in a total effect of around 3.5 per cent. In the service 
sector, all variations are fairly small but positive except for the inflation effect. 
Between 2008 and 2011 the overall relative ACE effect for the total economy was 
close to 2 per cent, due mainly to the dynamics of manufacturing and services. In the 
latter, the negative effects of GDP growth and prices are more than compensated by 
capital accumulation and capital prices. In manufacturing, both price and growth 
dynamics contributed to push the relative ACE up (and the equilibrium wage 
down), while capital accumulation exerted the opposite effect. Similar dynamics 
are observed in the primary sector, while in construction the relatively low growth 
was compensated by price dynamics. Finally, in the EGW sector the relative ACE 
went down, and the equilibrium wage up, due to the combined effect of GDP growth 
and capital accumulation.
In Germany, the total ACE effect has been slightly negative (and therefore 
increasing equilibrium wages). Before the crisis, this development was driven 
largely by real and nominal effects of capital accumulation, while since 2008 GDP 
growth has been the main driver of competitive gains. Only the primary sector shows 
the opposite dynamics. It is worth noting that the composite effect has been more 
important in construction and manufacturing, where competitiveness improved 
the most – that is, equilibrium wages went up – whereas in services the change 
was almost nil. Since the crisis, the overall ACE effect has been slightly negative 
but relatively small in the two main macro-sectors of manufacturing and services. 
In the primary sector, too, the overall ACE effect was null as a result of opposite 
changes in the growth effect (+7 per cent) and in price dynamics (–7.5 per cent). 
The construction sector shows a strong negative impact due to both GDP and price 
growth. Thus, the German story is one of supply-side transformation during the 
Schröder years and demand-side improvements during the Merkel years.
In Italy, we can observe positive ACE dynamics and deteriorating equilibrium wages 
everywhere, except for EGW, up to the global crisis. The main cause of this result 
4. In the Appendix 2 we show detailed sectoral data. For each figure, we show three series: the relative capital 
productivity and the relative price indexes for GDP and capital goods. In all series, the numerator is given 
by the EU value so that an increase implies lower growth with respect to the EU.
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is the relative growth effect which has been particularly strong in manufacturing. 
In construction, the effect of capital accumulation more than compensated the 
negative output effect. Between 2008 and 2011 the overall effect for the total 
economy was close to zero mainly because of a 2 per cent increase in manufacturing 
and a 1 per cent reduction in services. In all macro-sectors capital accumulation and 
the GDP deflator had a negative impact, whereas output growth and capital prices 
had an opposite effect. This leads to the conclusion that recession and austerity 
have harmed Italy’s competitiveness.
In Spain, the total ACE effect between 2000 and 2007 was 2 per cent, driving 
equilibrium wages down. This effect was driven mainly by capital accumulation and 
capital prices, in particular in the service sector and construction. In the latter, the 
effect is null due to the negative impact of output volumes and prices. The total 
effect between 2008 and 2011 was still slightly positive due to the contribution of 
construction and manufacturing. In both cases, the growth effect played the major 
role. In services, both GDP and capital prices pushed the overall effect to slightly 
negative values, although capital accumulation partly counterbalanced the result.
Among the other EMU countries (Figure 8), Austria experienced a strong 
reduction in relative ACE and improved equilibrium wages in the manufacturing 
sector due to capital prices and output growth, while in construction and utilities 
the negative impact was due mainly to capital accumulation. Thus, manufacturing 
competitiveness improved overall. The change in services was almost null, while 
the primary sector drove equilibrium wages down. In the post-Lehman period, the 
total effect was small everywhere as a result mainly of opposite dynamics in relative 
capital prices (positive), on one hand, and capital accumulation as well as GDP 
prices (negative) on the other. 
In Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands the total effect for the overall econo my 
was also relatively small in both periods due primarily to the dynamics in the service 
sector. In Belgium, the primary sector experienced a strong positive ACE effect in 
both periods due to output growth, whereas in the construction sector it increased 
strongly, essentially due to the relative capital accumulation effect. In Finland, it is 
interesting to observe that relative growth in manufacturing pushed the ACE effect 
down before the crisis, whereas this effect reversed in the following period.
Outside the non-Euro Area the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic and Poland 
are the most dynamic economies (Figure 9). In the Czech Republic, the ACE effect 
for the total economy was strongly negative (–3 per cent) before the crisis, mainly 
due to the relative price dynamics in all sectors but manufacturing. In the latter, 
relative output growth pushed down the overall effect. The following period seems 
to show a continuation of the previous dynamics in terms of price effects but this 
time the relative GDP deflator was not strong enough to counterbalance the positive 
impact of capital prices and output growth.
In Poland, too, the growth effect was the main driver for manufacturing up to 
2007, whereas capital accumulation in the service sector partially compensated this 
result. After the crisis, capital accumulation became the main force in pushing up 
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the relative ACE in services and construction, whereas in manufacturing its effect 
was negative and reinforced by the high real growth. 
Lastly, in the United Kingdom the total effect was very small everywhere except 
for the primary sector and construction until 2007. After that, the relative ACE fell 
in total by approximately 4 per cent, driven everywhere by capital accumulation 
and capital prices, especially in manufacturing and construction. The relative price 
effect, driven also by the exchange rate dynamics, counterbalanced the effect of 
the price of capital goods in services and, to a lower extent, in construction. This 
explains the United Kingdom’s improvement in competitiveness.
Summing up, the sectoral dynamics of the relative ACE provides an interesting 
explanation for the competitiveness gain in terms of rising equilibrium wages in 
the manufacturing sector before the global financial crisis. In Germany, Austria and 
the Netherlands this effect is driven essentially by capital accumulation, whereas in 
the two central and eastern European countries the catching-up in terms of output 
growth can explain the result. After the crisis, the overall change was fairly low and 
with less significant sectoral differences. The service sector does not seem to be 
particularly affected by important changes in both periods. Important exceptions 
are, in any case, the post-crisis effect in Italy and Poland. In the former, services 
partially counterbalanced the disappointing performance of the other sectors, 
driven by capital accumulation. 
Figure 7 Decomposition of the relative ACE effect in the main euro area countries 5
5. A positive increase in the ACE effect lowers the equilibrium wage
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Figure 8 Decomposition of the relative ACE effect in selected euro area countries
p€-p pk-pk€ y€-y k-k€ Total
Austria 2008-2011Austria 1999-2007
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
AMQ Constr EGW Manuf Serv Total
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
AMQ Constr EGW Manuf Serv Total
Belgium 2008-2011Belgium 1999-2007
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
AMQ Constr EGW Manuf Serv Total
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
AMQ Constr EGW Manuf Serv Total
Finland 2008-2011Finland 1999-2007
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
AMQ Constr EGW Manuf Serv Total
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
AMQ Constr EGW Manuf Serv Total
57
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure 9 Decomposition of the relative ACE effect in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
United Kingdom
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2.6 Sectoral shifts and competitiveness: comparing equilibrium 
wages and unit labour costs
In this final part of section 2 we wish to compare the performance of our measure 
of competitiveness based on the wage gap, with the traditional measure of 
competitiveness at sectoral level, that is unit labour costs. Unit labour costs are 
the standard indicators for measuring the relative competitiveness of industries or 
countries. The OECD provides a full set of statistics related to the cost of labour and 
they are used to build a measure of real effective exchange rates.6 
6. See OECD System of Unit Labour Cost Indicators, available at: http://stats.oecd.org/mei/default.
asp?rev=3.
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Figure 9 Decomposition of the relative ACE effect in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
United Kingdom (cont.)
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As pointed out in the introduction, comparing absolute developments of unit labour 
costs in different countries with regard to the EU average benchmark is not a suitable 
method. For this reason, we now compare our measure of equilibrium wages (using 
the EU average return on capital as benchmark) with relative nominal and real unit 
labour costs, expressed as a ratio to the EU average. We wish to test which of the 
two indexes can best explain changes in the sectoral shares of value added (see 
section 2.2). To do so, we use a simple regression equation of the following form:
(11) Δ푉퐴푠 ℎ 𝑖, 𝑡 푘 = 훼 + 훽훥 푋 𝑖, 𝑡 푘 +  휀 𝑖, 𝑡 
The variable X represents one of the measures of competitiveness, that is 
equilibrium wages (Weq), the implied competitiveness indicator (Comp=W–Weq) 
and the relative nominal ULC (ULCrel). We do not use the relative real unit labour 
costs as it is not a proper measure of competitiveness for countries in a monetary 
union. As explained by Peeters and den Reijer (2012), in a currency union internal 
devaluation is the standard way to restore competitiveness in terms of unit labour 
costs.
We use absolute changes in equilibrium wages instead of logs in order to make 
it more directly comparable with relative unit labour cost indicators, but the 
differences between the different forms of the variable are negligible. The above 
specification is estimated separately for each country using a panel of sectors i over 
time t (t = 1995, …,2011). As for the estimation technique, we tested different models 
and found that neither random nor sectoral fixed effects are significant; similar 
conclusions apply to the significance of time-specific dummies. Hence we use a 
simple pooled OLS where the presence of heteroscedasticity and cross correlation 
among panels is addressed by using panel corrected standard errors (Greene 2012).
The results are shown in Table 6 for the eight countries with a full data set. For all 
specifications we used the same sample size in order to exclude the possibility that 
differences in the results are due to the different data coverage of the explanatory 
variables. The coefficients are expressed in standardised terms in order to allow 
a direct comparison among the estimates. As we can clearly see, equilibrium 
wages and the competitive indicator are significant determinants of the changes 
in the share of value added for all countries, whereas nominal unit labour costs are 
insignificant in Spain and France and in general have a lower explanatory power in 
terms of R2. The differences between the explanatory power of equilibrium wages 
and our competitiveness indicator are largely insignificant, which might be because 
nominal wage dynamics present a drift and do not react to changes in relative 
productivity. 
Looking at the coefficients, the higher impacts are found in Finland and the 
Netherlands, where a standard deviation increase in equilibrium wages is associated 
with a change in the sector’s share by half a standard deviation. In Germany and 
Italy, the impact is slightly below 0.4, whereas in the remaining countries it is much 
lower and the explanatory power is rather low, suggesting that other factors played 
a major role in determining the sectoral recomposition of value added. 
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As a robustness check, we replicated the previous estimates using hourly measures 
of equilibrium wages, competitiveness and unit labour costs. As we can see in Table 
7, the results are practically unchanged in terms of significance and also the relative 
size of the impacts among countries is, in most of the cases, similar between the two 
specifications.
Thus, we can summarise the test results as follows: while there is no large 
difference between our equilibrium wage and the wage gap, both these 
indicators clearly provide greater insights and more information than 
unit labour cost indicators, which are usually used in competitiveness 
assessments. 
Table 6 Estimation results for the relationship between changes in the sectoral shares 
in value added and competitiveness
 
∆(Weq)
R2w
RMSE
Wald
N
∆(Comp)
R2w
RMSE
Wald
N
∆(ULCrel)
R2w
RMSE
Wald
N
ITA
0.379***
[10.018]
0.144
0.125
100.4
464
ITA
–.365***
[–9.918]
0.134
0.126
98.4
464
ITA
–0.125**
[–3.092]
0.016
0.134
9.6
464
DE
0.390***
[6.510]
0.153
0.17
42.4
480
DE
–.370***
[–6.422]
0.138
0.172
41.2
480
DE
–0.273***
[–6.072]
0.075
0.178
36.9
480
ESP
0.123***
[4.168]
0.015
0.221
17.4
295
ESP
–0.118***
[–4.180]
0.014
0.221
17.5
295
ESP
–0.049
[–0.906]
0.002
0.223
0.8
295
FR
0.171***
[4.731]
0.029
0.148
22.4
384
FR
–0.167***
[–4.688]
0.028
0.148
22
384
FR
–0.039
[–1.112]
0.002
0.15
1.2
384
NL
0.508***
[13.877]
0.258
0.173
192.6
464
NL
–0.507***
[–13.891]
0.258
0.173
193
464
NL
–0.168***
[–7.339]
0.028
0.198
53.9
464
AUT
0.272***
[9.289]
0.074
0.123
86.3
480
AUT
–0.269***
[–9.401]
0.073
0.123
88.4
480
AUT
–0.298***
[–7.882]
0.062
0.124
62.1
480
BEL
0.328***
[10.832]
0.107
0.138
117.3
464
BEL
–0.314***
[–10.820]
0.099
0.139
117.1
464
BEL
–0.188***
[–5.729]
0.035
0.143
32.8
464
FIN
0.491***
[7.387] 
0.242
0.25
54.6
464
FIN
–0.402***
[–7.236] 
0.232
0.252
52.4
464
FIN
–0.283***
[–5.142] 
0.08
0.275
26.4
464
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; R2w = within groups R squared; 
RMSE = Root Mean Square Error. 
Dependent variable: change in the sectoral shares in total value added (∆VA_share)
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Table 7 Estimation results for the relationship between changes in the sectoral shares 
in value added and competitiveness (hourly wage data)
 
∆(Weq_h)
R2w
RMSE
Wald
N
∆(Comp_h)
R2w
RMSE
Wald
N
∆(ULCrel_h)
R2w
RMSE
Wald
N
ITA
0.218***
[5.302]
0.11
0.131
28.1
428
ITA
–0.230***
[–5.345]
0.115
0.131
28.6
428
ITA
–0.297**
[–2.546]
0.013
0.138
6.5
428
DE
0.427***
[10.553]
0.155
0.144
111.4
416
DE
–0.416***
[–10.775]
0.148
0.144
116.1
416
DE
–0.276***
[–5.590]
0.052
0.152
31.2
416
ESP
0.282***
[4.338]
0.033
0.225
18.8
261
ESP
–0.288***
[–5.066]
0.035
0.224
25.7
261
ESP
–0.303
[–1.446]
0.003
0.228
2.1
261
FR
0.329***
[5.456]
0.135
0.124
29.8
366
FR
–0.318***
[–5.318]
0.129
0.124
28.3
366
FR
–0.049
[–0.472]
0.001
0.133
0.2
366
NL
0.317***
[6.992]
0.148
0.182
48.9
440
NL
–0.319***
[–7.027]
0.148
0.182
49.4
440
NL
–0.384***
[–6.206]
0.029
0.194
38.5
440
AUT
0.349***
[8.830]
0.187
0.112
78
460
AUT
–0.343***
[–8.790]
0.186
0.112
77.3
460
AUT
–0.319***
[–8.565]
0.071
0.12
73.4
460
BEL
0.368***
[5.710]
0.154
0.134
32.6
318
BEL
–0.349***
[–5.855]
0.148
0.135
34.3
318
BEL
–0.509***
[–7.238]
0.067
0.141
52.4
318
FIN
0.919***
[9.359] 
0.272
0.235
87.6
448
FIN
–0.874***
[–8.635] 
0.254
0.238
74.6
448
FIN
–0.961***
[-5.370] 
0.094
0.262
28.8
448
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level; R2w = within groups R squared; 
RMSE = Root Mean Square Error.

3.
Determinants of
competitiveness
Having proven that our measure of competitiveness is more effective in explaining 
the relative importance of the different sectors, we will now assess what factors are 
driving the evolution of equilibrium wages and competitiveness. The theoretical 
definition of equilibrium wages (equation 9) links competitiveness, as expressed by 
the ratio of actual to equilibrium wages, to capital intensity, capital productivity and 
the relative price effect. 
In order to shed light on the determinants of equilibrium wages and competitiveness, 
we use a two-step methodology. In the first step, we focus on the capital–labour ratio 
and use a production function approach in order to derive an empirical specification 
relating capital accumulation to the dynamics of relative factor prices and to the 
bias in technical change. The latter is a measure of how capital intensity changed 
due to technological factors and to exogenous movements in factor prices. In the 
second step, we use the measure of bias in technical change as a determinant of 
equilibrium wages, together with the relative price effect. In both steps we introduce 
as additional explanatory variables two proxies for the globalisation process that 
characterised both advanced and developing countries since the start of the 1990s: 
import outsourcing and export intensity. We test whether these factors explain the 
specific changes that have occurred in the different countries under our analysis.
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3.1 Theoretical model: a CES production function approach
The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function is a general class of 
production functions that includes the well-known Cobb Douglas as a special case 
with elasticity of factor substitution equal to 1. The Cobb Douglas formulation is 
not useful for our purposes because, on one hand, most of the evidence points to an 
elasticity of substitution substantially below 1. On the other hand, as we mentioned 
in the introduction, the Cobb Douglas function does not allow changes in the factor 
shares, which are of the utmost importance in explaining competitiveness changes.
A general form of the CES production function includes both labour augmenting 
and capital augmenting parameters (aL and aK):
  푌 = 퐴 [ ( 푎 퐿 퐿) 휌    +  ( 푎 퐾 퐾) 휌  ] 1 /휌  
where 휌 is the elasticity of substitution. The long-run profit maximisation implies that 
in equilibrium L and K are remunerated according to their marginal productivity: 
(12)   푀푃퐿 = 퐴 [  ( 푎 퐿 퐿) 휌 +  ( 푎 퐾 퐾) 휌  ]  
1−휌 _휌   푎 퐿 휌 퐿 휌−1 =  
푊 _푃 
(13)   푀푃퐾 = 퐴 [  ( 푎 퐿 퐿) 휌 +  ( 푎 퐾 퐾) 휌  ]  
1−휌 _휌   푎 퐾 휌 퐾 휌−1 =  
푟 _ 푃
Hence, in equilibrium the marginal rate of transformation between labour and 
capital equals the relative price of the two factors: 
(14)  푀푅푇 =  (  푎 푳  __ 푎 퐾 ) 
휌
  ( 퐾 _푳)  
1−휌
 =  푊 _푟 
This is, of course, an indicator of the equilibrium distribution of value added. With 
higher wages or lower return on capital (which in equilibrium is equal to interest 
rates), the MRT becomes steeper. We assume that all variables are stochastic and 
can change over time; thus by transforming equation (12) into logs and adding a 
time subscript we get: 
(15)  휌  (푙표푔 푎 푳𝒕 − 푙표푔 푎 퐾𝒕 ) + (1−휌)  ( 푘 𝒕 −  푙 𝒕 ) =  푤 𝒕 −  푟 𝒕 
which can be solved for the log of the capital–labour ratio: 
(16)  푘 𝒕 − 푙 𝒕 =  
휌 _ 1−휌 (푙표푔 푎 퐾𝒕 −푙표푔 푎 퐿𝒕  ) +  1 _ 1−휌 ( 푤 𝒕 −  푟 𝒕 ) =  휌 _ 1−휌  훾 𝒕  +  1 _ 1−휌 ( 푤 𝒕 −  푟 𝒕 )  
where  
(17)  (푙표푔 푎 퐾𝒕 − 푙표푔 푎 푳𝒕 ) =  훾 𝒕 
Equation (16) states that in equilibrium the capital–labour ratio is a function of the 
relative factor price and of the difference between logs of capital augmenting and 
labour augmenting technical parameters. The parameter γ can then be considered 
a measure of biased technical change. Capital biased change, which implies a 
positive sign for 훾𝑡, will save labour and increase the capital share (lower the labour 
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share), while a negative value of 훾𝑡 implies that technical change has augmented the 
efficiency of labour inputs more than the efficiency of capital, with a consequent 
rise in the labour share. Hence, a positive 훾𝑡 indicates technologies that save more 
labour than capital (also called Harrod-neutral technological progress) and thereby 
increase the equilibrium wage. 
By first differentiating equation (16) we obtain a relation between (log) growth 
rates: 
(18)  Δ  ( 푘 𝒕 −  푙 𝒕 ) =  휌 _ 1−휌 Δ 훾 𝒕 +  1 _ 1−휌 (Δ 푤 𝒕 − Δ 푟 𝒕 ) =  휌 _ 1−휌 Δ 훾 𝒕  +   1 _ 1−휌 Δ푟푓 푝 𝒕 
which states that the growth rate of the capital–labour ratio is a linear combination 
of changes in the relative factor prices and changes in the ratio between the 
capital and labour augmenting parameters of the CES production function (the 
bias in technical change). Note that these are technological processes, although 
the adoption of such technology depends on microeconomic relative costs. For 
example, falling prices in IT technology will increase the incentive to adopt capital 
augmenting (labour saving) technology, while lower minimum wages may increase 
labour augmenting (capital saving) technology. While a lower minimum wage may 
be compensated in aggregate by higher wages elsewhere (especially for high skilled 
labour), a fall in interest rates relative to wages is likely to increase the K/L ratio 
and, ceteris paribus, the equilibrium wage. 
This is an interesting result. It means that 
— under certain conditions, the rise in equilibrium wages can be the consequence 
of actual wage increases, provided they are not inflationary and do not cause 
interest rate increases; 
— a fall in the equilibrium wage may be caused by economic uncertainty and 
higher risk premia in the interest rate;
— a rise in the equilibrium wage may be the consequence of capital-biased 
technological change; 
— to the degree that outsourcing of low-skill labour increases capital-biased 
technological change and the capital share (see below), outsourcing increases 
equilibrium wages and incentives for ‘keeping jobs at home’ may lower the 
equilibrium wage and competitiveness.
Interestingly, the developments after European monetary union started had very 
differentiated effects. In many southern crisis countries, but not in Germany, 
interest rates came down, thereby raising the capital–labour ratio and the 
equilibrium wage. But when the global financial crisis hit, this process was reversed. 
By contrast, in Germany, where interest rates were relatively stable, the change in 
equilibrium wages must be explained primarily by technological change. 
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3.2 Estimation of the bias in technical change
In order to obtain an empirical equivalent of equation (18) we would need data 
on the cost of capital for each manufacturing sector. The cost of capital is usually 
calculated as a weighted average of the cost of the different sources of firms’ 
financing (also called the weighted average cost of capital [WACC]), where a main 
distinction is between debt financing and equity financing. In order to obtain 
estimates of the weighted average cost of capital representative firm-level data are 
required. Assuming efficient capital markets means that the weighted average cost 
of capital is the same across sectors and varies only over time. We can then estimate 
equation (18) by assuming that common variations in the weighted average cost of 
capital are captured by yearly dummies and the empirical specification becomes:
(19)  Δ ( 푘 𝒊, 𝒕 −  푙 𝒊, 𝒕 ) =  훽 1 +   훽 2 Δ 푤 𝒊, 𝒕  +  휃 𝒕 +  푢 𝒊 +  휀 𝒊, 𝒕 
Where u 𝒊 + ε 𝒊,  𝒕 is the error component made up of sector-specific effects and the 
two-way error term, whereas 휃푡 is a set of time dummies that controls for common 
changes in the weighted average cost of capital and for any other shocks common 
to all sectors. In particular, both domestic and external demand can generate 
important common effects. The two factors are also influenced by the fiscal and 
monetary policy stances, which have played an important role since the global 
financial crisis. We estimate equation (19) on a panel of i sectors over time for each 
country and use the fixed effect estimator (FE).
A proxy of biased technical change could be obtained from the estimated residuals. 
In this way, it can be expressed as the sum of the constant term and the sector-
specific effects multiplied by a function of the elasticity of substitution:
(20)  훽 1 +  푢 𝒊  +  휀 𝒊, 𝒕 =   
휌 _ 1−휌Δ 훾 𝒊 
Due to the lack of sector-specific data on the weighted average cost of capital, our 
final measure is multiplied by the ratio  
 휌 _
 1−휌 but since the use of a CES production 
function implies that capital and labour have a degree of complementarity, the elas-
ti city of substitution ρ is below 1, which means that the sign of Δ(푙표푔푎푘−푙표푔푎푙) and 
that of equation (20) are the same. This means that the indices of bias in technical 
change built in this way are a monotonic transformation of the real indexes, 
providing by consequence the same information on the dynamics of capital intensity 
due to biases in technology.
Among the determinants of factor intensities, the delocalisation of production, 
which can be classified as a form of technical change, plays an important role. 
Recent works on the subject (Timmer et al. 2014; Amador et al. 2015) indicate a 
transformation of the labour market. The increased fragmentation of production 
processes across different countries is usually associated with an increase in 
the relative use of capital and skilled labour. This is explained by the increased 
importance of new technologies embedded in capital equipment, especially ICT and 
financial capital in favouring the delocalisation of some stages of production. These 
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types of capital are a complement to skilled labour (Autor et al. 2003; Acemoglu 
1999; Acemoglu 2002; Esposito and Stehrer 2012), and a substitute for medium 
and low skilled jobs. Finally, the effect on the capital–labour ratio depends on the 
recomposition of employment among skill groups. (Timmer et al. 2014) show that 
among the main euro area countries, the effect is positive – that is, it increases 
the capital share – for Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, null for France and 
negative for Italy. The effect for the latter is due to a small reduction in the capital 
share caused by the strong increase in the share of medium-skilled workers. This 
literature emphasises changes in factor shares and their dynamics. It is broadly 
consistent, on a descriptive level, with our sectoral measure of the profit shares 
which report a reduction in the wage share for most of the countries. 
In order to control for the effect of outsourcing on factor intensities we augment 
equation (19) by introducing the share of imported intermediates in total 
intermediate inputs (ImpII), which represent the inward outsourcing process, and 
the share of exports in total value added (ExpVA) representing a general measure 
of export intensity. The two measures are taken from the OECD World Input 
Output Database (Timmer et al. 2015) and represent better proxies of outsourcing 
and export intensity than the standard national accounts and custom data. The 
estimated specification is as follows:
(21)  Δ ( 푘 𝒊, 𝒕 −  푙 𝒊, 𝒕 ) =  훽 1 +   훽 2 Δlog  ( 푤 𝒊, 𝒕 ) +  훽 3 Δ퐼푚푝퐼 퐼 𝒊, 𝒕 +  훽 4  Δ퐸푥푝푉 퐴 𝒊, 𝒕 +  휃 𝒕 +  푢 𝒊 +  휀 𝒊, 𝒕 
The difference in btc estimates between equations (19) and (21) is an indirect 
measure of how much of the change in factor intensities is due to the globalisation 
of production processes.
Equations (19) and (21) are estimated using the fixed effects (FE) estimator. In 
addition, separate specifications are estimated for the manufacturing sector and for 
services, given their different behaviour in terms of international competitiveness 
and outsourcing relations. Before discussing the estimation results, we must clarify 
that our approach is different from the studies mentioned above (Timmer et al. 
2014) as we are interested in the determinants of the capital–labour ratio, which is 
on the LHS of equation (18), while they assessed the change in relative factor prices 
due to the outsourcing process. 
The estimation results are shown in Tables 8 and and 10, while in Table 11 we show 
the distribution of biased technical change (see equation 20) in manufacturing and 
services for the different countries. In Table 10 we also show the same estimates 
for capital per hours worked rather than capital per worker; the results are fairly 
similar, which is why we stick to average wages in the other tables. 
In manufacturing (Table 8), we find that the impact of the average wage on the 
capital–labour ratio has a significant coefficient close to unit in Spain and France, 
while in Finland its impact is around 0.3. In the other countries (Italy, Germany, 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium), wage movements alone are not significant in 
explaining the change in the capital–labour ratio, because the coefficients are not 
significant and this is not an estimation of the elasticity of substitution. 
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Timmer et al. (2014) have found evidence for the thesis that firms in mature 
economies relocate their unskilled labour-intensive production activities to 
lower-wage countries, while keeping strategic and high-value-added functions 
concentrated at home where the skilled workers and intangible capital they need 
are available.
Our results tend to confirm the findings of Timmer et al. (2014). The impact 
of inward outsourcing – that is, of buying intermediary inputs abroad rather 
than producing them locally – is negative and significant in Germany and the 
Netherlands. This result is in line with the assumption that capital intensive 
stages of production are more likely to be delocalised, reducing by 
consequence the ratio within each manufacturing industry. It must be 
noted that while this effect implies a reduction in equilibrium wages (see formula 
9), the total effect of outsourcing on equilibrium wages depends nevertheless 
also on its impact on capital productivity (see section 3.3 below). Finally, export 
intensity is positive and significant in Italy, Spain and, to a lower extent, in the 
Netherlands, whereas it is negative and significant in Germany. The positive impact 
implies that, having controlled for the outsourcing process, an increase in the export 
intensity of the first three countries is associated with higher capital intensity. 
This result can be intuitively explained by two factors: first, in order to compete in 
international markets firms must invest more in new technologies and in product 
quality; second, the role of firm size is important as larger firms are more likely to be 
stay competitive in international markets and larger firms are usually more capital 
intensive. The German case, instead, can be explained by the higher role played by 
inward outsourcing and by the labour market reforms that helped to maintain high 
levels of employment despite the overall technological progress taking place in the 
global economy. This is also coherent with Sinn’s (2006) hypothesis that during the 
previous decade Germany had become a bazaar economy specialised in low value 
added exports. 
Turning to the service sector (Table 10), we find wages to have a positive and 
significant impact on the capital–labour ratio in Italy, Spain and France, with 
coefficients ranging from 0.36 to 0.58. Outsourcing seems to play a role only in 
Finland, where the share of imported intermediate input increases the capital to 
labour ratio. The export intensity is, instead, never significant. These results are not 
unexpected as the bulk of outsourcing covers manufactured goods, benefitting the 
service sector through the use of globally built equipment goods. The heterogeneity 
in the sectoral requirements in terms of imported capital goods and the distinction 
between tradable and non-tradable services add to the difficulty of identifying 
significant correlations.
To sum up, the estimates indicate that the manufacturing and service sectors 
behave differently in all countries. In manufacturing, international outsourcing 
is particularly important in explaining the German dynamics of capital intensity, 
whereas export intensity seems to have a more generalised effect.
69
Table 8 Dependent variable log of the capital–labour ratio for manufacturing
Table 9 Dependent variable log of the capital–labour (in hours) ratio for 
manufacturing; hourly wages
 
∆w
R²w
N
∆w
∆ImpII
∆ExpVA
R²w
N
 
∆w
R²w
N
∆w
∆ImpII
∆ExpVA
R²w
N
ITA
0.148
[0.152]
0.162
192
ITA
0.052
[0.144]
–0.304
[0.234]
0.026**
[0.010]
0.179
191
ITA
0.662**
[0.181]
0.403
160
ITA
0.664**
[0.195]
–0.360**
[0.098]
0.01
[0.006]
0.415
159
DE
0.183
[0.168]
0.119
208
DE
0.169
[0.140]
–0.146**
[0.066]
–0.034***
[0.003]
0.238
208
DE
0.305
[0.188]
0.357
176
DE
0.251
[0.149]
–0.168***
[0.034]
–0.034***
[0.003]
0.453
176
ESP
0.908***
[0.170]
0.317
121
ESP
1.015**
[0.319]
–1.453
[0.861]
0.023*
[0.011]
0.388
121
ESP
1.024***
[0.189]
0.361
121
ESP
1.042**
[0.236]
–1.46
[0.813]
0.023
[0.013]
0.43
121
FR
0.928**
[0.273]
0.249
132
FR
1.001**
[0.339]
–0.38
[0.260]
–0.006
[0.010]
0.257
132
FR
0.685**
[0.192]
0.236
128
FR
0.772**
[0.292]
–0.272
[0.265]
–0.005
[0.008]
0.24
128
NL
–0.156
[0.665]
0.131
192
NL
0.018
[0.592]
–0.576*
[0.273]
0.014***
[0.002]
0.194
192
NL
–0.195
[0.405]
0.107
192
NL
–0.102
[0.364]
–0.549*
[0.253]
0.014***
[0.002]
0.176
192
AUT
0.181
[0.590]
0.076
208
AUT
0.200
[0.641]
0.402
[0.297]
0.000
[0.024]
0.088
208
AUT
0.049
[0.388]
0.09
208
AUT
0.091
[0.388]
0.321
[0.349]
–0.005
[0.017]
0.098
208
BEL
0.229
[0.227]
0.227
192
BEL
0.228
[0.229]
–0.082
[0.138]
0.007
[0.006]
0.234
192
BEL
–0.078
[0.106]
0.369
120
BEL
–0.072
[0.107]
0.015
[0.257]
0.002
[0.002]
0.37
120
FIN
0.322** 
[0.097] 
0.201
192
FIN
0.282** 
[0.113] 
0.038
[0.215] 
0.019
[0.018] 
0.228
192
FIN
0.641***
[0.111] 
0.405
192
FIN
0.587** 
[0.138] 
–0.066
[0.244] 
0.023
[0.017] 
0.428
192
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. RoC=adjusted return on capital; 
Wage=average compensation per employee. Imp/II=Imports on intermediate inputs (from input output tables). Exp/VA=Exports 
on value added (from input output tables). R2w=within groups R squared.
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. RoC=adjusted return on capital; 
Wage=average compensation per employee. Imp/II=Imports on intermediate inputs (from input output tables). Exp/VA=Exports 
on value added (from input output tables). R2w=within groups R squared.
Basic specification (equation 19)
Basic specification (equation 19)
Outsourcing augmented specification (equation 21)
Outsourcing augmented specification (equation 21)
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The distributions of the capital biased (that is, labour saving) technical change in the 
two main macro-sectors –   
휌
 
_
 1−휌
 Δ 훾 𝒊 as calculated in equation (20) and derived from 
Tables 8 and 10 – are shown in Table 11. The numbers indicate the final value of the 
factor changes in the log of the ratio a k / a l, that is,  (푙표푔 푎 퐾𝒕 − 푙표푔 푎 퐿𝒕  )  =  훾 𝒕 (multiplied by 
the term ρ/1–ρ) and its probability distribution in terms of percentiles. A positive 
value indicates a bias in favour of capital, while a negative value indicates a bias in 
favour of labour. Values on the 50 per cent column indicate the median change of 
the ratio, and a similar logic applies to the other percentiles. Thus, for example in 
Germany 75 per cent of all manufacturing sectors use labour-saving technology, but 
in France it is only 25 per cent and in Spain even less. By contrast, in the service 
sector, the distribution is close to 50:50 in all countries. 
The estimates reveal useful information, which integrates the evidence collected 
so far. In aggregate, all euro area member states reveal capital-augmenting biased 
technological change, although the estimates confirm the difference between 
manufacturing and services, the former having experienced a higher tendency to 
a capital bias in technical change, as shown by the median values (50 per cent). 
In all countries and in both macro-sectors the results come from strong changes 
between individual sectors, with particularly large tails in Finland, Austria, and 
the Netherlands in manufacturing. The latter two show similar dynamics also in 
services, and Spain shows sectors with particularly low levels. The Spanish case can 
be explained by the large immigration from Latin America, which is concentrated in 
labour intensive sectors, whereas the peaks in capital biases might be due to the role 
of multinational investment and the high increase in the share of college graduates 
during the past 20 years.
Table 10 Dependent variable log of the capital-labour ratio for services
 
∆w
R²w
N
∆w
∆ImpII
∆ExpVA
R²w
N
ITA
0.301**
[0.104]
0.32
192
ITA
0.367**
[0.082]
0.149
[0.375]
0.384
[0.401]
0.377
176
DE
0.092
[0.097]
0.1
192
DE
0.022
[0.113]
0.577
[0.389]
–0.102
[0.109]
0.122
176
ESP
0.401***
[0.079]
0.427
119
ESP
0.395***
[0.080]
–1.126*
[0.599]
–0.114
[0.214]
0.444
108
FR
0.485*
[0.223]
0.328
192
FR
0.585**
[0.199]
–0.667
[0.487]
0.372
[0.273]
0.347
176
NL
0.533*
[0.274]
0.106
192
NL
0.542
[0.368]
–0.178
[0.413]
0.123
[0.147]
0.11
176
AUT
0.409
[0.249]
0.117
192
AUT
0.618
[0.363]
0.198
[0.497]
–0.07
[0.083]
0.143
176
BEL
0.203
[0.127]
0.124
192
BEL
0.107
[0.075]
0.012
[0.170]
–0.051
[0.041]
0.118
176
FIN
0.208
[0.248]
0.105
192
FIN
0.196
[0.242] 
0.465** 
[0.149] 
0.057
[0.090] 
0.163
176
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. RoC=adjusted return on capital; 
Wage=average compensation per employee. Imp/II=Imports on intermediate inputs (from input output tables). Exp/VA=Exports 
on value added (from input output tables). R2w=within groups R squared.
Basic specification (equation 19)
Outsourcing augmented specification (equation 21)
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3.3 Biased technical change, outsourcing and competitiveness
From equation (9) we know that equilibrium wages depend crucially on the 
relative price effect, on the capital–labour ratio and on capital productivity. In the 
previous section we extracted the part of the changes in the capital–labour ratio 
due to factor price movements and assumed that the residual is a measure of the 
bias in technological change (btc), including the effects of outsourcing and export 
intensity. In this section, we seek to understand what forces are driving changes 
in wage competitiveness as described by the gap between equilibrium and actual 
wages. 
The bias in technical change remains the main explanatory variable, but we also 
add the price effect (the relative GDP deflator) and the two measures of inward 
outsourcing and export intensity used in the previous analysis. The latter are 
included because they can affect competitiveness through other channels than 
the relative change in factor use. For example, by simply increasing the amount of 
trade they can foster the diffusion of international knowledge spillovers (Coe and 
Helpmann 1995) or the exploitation of economies of scale, or increase productivity 
due to efficient production delocalisation and to a market size effect (Rodrik 1988) 
(Yeaple 2005). All these factors imply an increase in capital productivity and 
therefore affect equilibrium wages as we have defined them. 
Table 11 Distribution of the log growth rate of biased technical change in 
manufacturing (percentiles)
 
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Spain 
Finland
France
Italy
Netherlands
 
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Spain 
Finland
France
Italy
Netherlands
0.01 
–0.31 
–0.29 
–0.08 
–0.22 
–0.37 
–0.19 
–0.13 
–0.21 
0.01 
–0.37 
–0.11 
–0.09 
–0.26 
–0.11 
–0.19 
–0.15 
–0.40 
0.05 
–0.11 
–0.07 
–0.01 
–0.15 
–0.08 
–0.14 
–0.05 
–0.11  
0.05 
–0.13 
–0.06 
–0.04 
–0.15 
–0.06 
–0.07 
–0.09 
–0.17 
0.10 
–0.04 
–0.01 
0.00 
–0.11 
–0.03 
–0.09 
–0.03 
–0.06  
0.10 
–0.08 
–0.04 
–0.03 
–0.09 
–0.04 
–0.05 
–0.05 
–0.09 
0.25 
0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
–0.06 
0.03 
–0.05 
0.00 
–0.03 
0.25 
–0.04 
–0.02 
–0.01 
–0.04 
–0.02 
–0.01 
–0.01 
–0.02 
0.50 
0.04 
0.06 
0.05 
–0.04 
0.07 
–0.02 
0.02 
–0.01  
0.50 
–0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
–0.01 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.75 
0.07 
0.09 
0.07 
0.00 
0.10 
0.01 
0.05 
0.01  
0.75 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.05 
0.05 
0.06 
0.90
0.11 
0.11 
0.10 
0.05 
0.14 
0.04 
0.07 
0.07 
0.90 
0.05 
0.05 
0.04 
0.06 
0.05 
0.09 
0.10 
0.12 
0.95 
0.17 
0.12 
0.11 
0.10 
0.18 
0.06 
0.08 
0.10  
0.95 
0.08 
0.08 
0.05 
0.09 
0.07 
0.12 
0.12 
0.17 
0.99 
0.28 
0.22 
0.23 
0.26 
0.29 
0.28 
0.13 
0.34  
0.99 
0.17 
0.17 
0.15 
0.15 
0.13 
0.21 
0.21 
0.34 
Source: Authors’ estimation.
Manufacturing
Services
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The estimated specification is as follows: 
(22)  Δ퐶표푚 푝 𝒊,  𝒕 = 훼+ 훽 1 푏푡 c 𝒕 +  훽 2 Δ퐼푚푝퐼 퐼 𝒊, 𝒕 +  훽 3 Δ퐸푥푝푉 퐴 𝒊, 𝒕 +  훽 4 Δ푃푌푒푓 푓 𝒊, 𝒕 +  휃 𝒕 +  푢 𝒊 +  휀 𝒊, 𝒕 
where PYeff is the GDP price effects, defined as the log difference between European 
and national prices, and Comp is the measure of wage competitiveness given by the 
ratio of actual to equilibrium wages. Hence, an increase in Δ푪풐풎풑𝒊,𝒕 reflects a 
deterioration of competitiveness. The coefficients 휃 and u represent, as before, 
time and sector-specific dummies. We do not include the relative capital deflator as 
it turned out to be never significant. The equation is estimated, as before, with the 
fixed effect estimator. 
The results are shown in Table 12 for manufacturing and in Table 13 for services. 
Each panel presents specifications adding one by one the variables of equation 22, 
starting with btc only. In manufacturing, the common result is the positive and 
significant impact of the relative price effect, the only exception being Austria. The 
inward outsourcing variable is negative and significant in Germany, France and 
Austria, leading to higher competitiveness, whereas it is positive, although only 
weakly significant, in Spain. Finally, the export intensity is positive and significant 
in all countries except Spain (where it is negative), while it is insignificant in 
Belgium and Finland. 
The bias in technical change has a differentiated effect. In Italy it is negative but it 
turns insignificant when controlling for the price effect; in Germany it is positive 
but it becomes insignificant when export intensity is added; in France it is robustly 
negative and significant in all specifications, implying that having controlled for all 
other factors the capital bias in technical change has increased the competitiveness 
of the country; a similar result holds weakly for Finland. In Spain, Austria and the 
Netherlands it is instead positive and significant, implying that a bias in favour 
of capital and labour saving actually causes a reduction in competitiveness. The 
results for these countries can be explained by the negative dynamics of capital 
productivity caused by changes in the capital–labour ratio, not due to the effects 
of outsourcing and export intensity. This assumption seems to be in line with the 
reduced dynamics of manufacturing capital productivity, as shown in Figures A2.1, 
A2.6 and A2.10.
Turning to the service sector (Table 13) the evidence is much weaker. The price 
effect tends to be positive and significant, whereas neither inward outsourcing not 
export intensity play a role in explaining wage competitiveness. This result is in line 
with the previous finding. Finally, the bias in technical change is significant only in 
Germany and with a positive sign, which indicates deterioration in competitiveness 
in services. This suggests that in this country services absorbed most of the low wage-
low value added jobs created as a consequence of the labour market reforms (Hartz 
IV and so on) and by the recomposition of employment in manufacturing. 
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To sum up, our results indicate that the bias in technical change, outsourcing and 
export intensity exert a strong impact on wage competitiveness and that these 
effects are concentrated in the manufacturing sector. The results, combined with 
those in section 3.2 provide an interesting explanation for the German case: 
— the outsourcing process has improved the country’s competitiveness because 
the negative effect on capital intensity is more than compensated by the 
positive effect on capital productivity; 
— on the other hand, the increased export intensity has lowered competitiveness 
as it reduced both capital intensity and capital productivity. 
Table 12 Estimates of competitiveness for manufacturing industries
 
btc
R2w
N
btc
∆PYe¥
R²w
N
btc_
∆PYe¥
∆ImpII
R²w
N
btc_
∆PYe¥
∆ImpII
∆ExpVA
R²w
N
ITA
–0.468***
[0.084]
0.14
189
ITA
–0.01
[0.092]
1.314***
[0.045]
0.617
189
ITA
–0.04
[0.054]
1.322***
[0.036]
1.109
[0.946]
0.632
188
ITA
–0.015
[0.081]
1.317***
[0.037]
0.855
[0.781]
0.073
[0.086]
0.635
188
DE
0.293**
[0.070]
0.172
208
DE
0.295**
[0.073]
0.251***
[0.007]
0.243
208
DE
0.517***
[0.066]
0.336***
[0.020]
–1.783***
[0.255]
0.336
208
DE
0.109
[0.099]
0.335***
[0.032]
–3.302***
[0.611]
0.217***
[0.025]
0.595
208
ESP
0.092*
[0.045]
0.218
119
ESP
0.054**
[0.023]
3.026***
[0.145]
0.829
119
ESP
0.050**
[0.022]
3.036***
[0.144]
0.618
[0.594]
0.83
119
ESP
0.048**
[0.020]
3.192***
[0.203]
1.131*
[0.622]
–0.133**
[0.038]
0.857
119
FR
–0.088***
[0.012]
0.367
128
FR
–0.013***
[0.001]
0.996***
[0.033]
0.789
128
FR
–0.013***
[0.001]
0.998***
[0.034]
0.228
[0.302]
0.789
128
FR
–0.024***
[0.004]
0.871***
[0.029]
–0.724**
[0.265]
0.210***
[0.013]
0.876
128
NL
–0.565
[0.678]
0.156
187
NL
0.818**
[0.217]
1.921***
[0.064]
0.673
187
NL
0.767**
[0.232]
1.951***
[0.069]
0.832*
[0.446]
0.68
187
NL
0.805**
[0.202]
1.784***
[0.081]
0.112
[0.627]
0.020***
[0.004]
0.708
187
AUT
0.677***
[0.100]
0.357
208
AUT
0.634***
[0.081]
–0.211***
[0.013]
0.46
208
AUT
0.615***
[0.075]
–0.209***
[0.012]
–0.745**
[0.174]
0.477
208
AUT
0.617***
[0.070]
–0.200***
[0.014]
–1.045***
[0.170]
0.164***
[0.019]
0.626
208
BEL
0.389
[0.242]
0.174
192
BEL
0.491
[0.275]
0.956***
[0.177]
0.365
192
BEL
0.49
[0.274]
0.946***
[0.182]
–0.18
[0.376]
0.365
192
BEL
0.488*
[0.270]
0.957**
[0.236]
–0.145
[0.454]
–0.003
[0.017]
0.365
192
FIN
–0.355
[0.207]
0.153
192
FIN 
–0.416
[0.254] 
0.933***
[0.127] 
0.415
192
FIN 
–0.38
[0.242] 
0.873***
[0.089] 
1.257
[0.865] 
0.444
192
FIN 
–0.194* 
[0.101] 
0.811***
[0.101] 
0.224
[0.379] 
0.176***
[0.018] 
0.633
192
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. btc=bias in technological change. 
r2w=within groups R squared.
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— the actual changes in these two variables suggest that the effect of inward 
outsourcing prevails, meaning that competitiveness has actually improved 
due to globalisation.
The effect of export intensity is common to most of the countries, suggesting that it 
is the result of a general tendency affecting the whole European economy, while btc 
appears to be particularly important in the other northern countries, as well as in 
Spain. Among core countries, France and, to a lesser extent, Finland, seem to be the 
only gainers from this process.
Table 13 Estimates of competitiveness for manufacturing industries
 
btc
R2w
N
btc
∆PYe¥
R²w
N
btc_
∆PYe¥
∆ImpII
R²w
N
btc_
∆PYe¥
∆ImpII
∆ExpVA
R²w
N
ITA
–1.257
[1.054]
0.222
191
ITA
–1.222
[1.109]
0.159
[0.594]
0.222
191
ITA
–1.688
[1.459]
0.866
[0.577]
3.834
[2.655]
0.262
175
ITA
–1.665
[1.449]
0.723
[0.590]
2.735
[2.399]
2.268
[3.047]
0.267
175
DE
0.153
[0.206]
0.087
176
DE
0.202
[0.248]
0.252
[0.186]
0.096
176
DE
0.454**
[0.144]
0.383**
[0.138]
0.614
[0.533]
0.142
160
DE
0.456**
[0.142]
0.381**
[0.138]
0.658
[0.513]
–0.249
[0.263]
0.143
160
ESP
0.574*
[0.280]
0.372
87
ESP
0.508*
[0.230]
1.182***
[0.200]
0.396
87
ESP
0.504
[0.285]
1.309***
[0.206]
–0.273
[1.644]
0.4
76
ESP
0.498
[0.290]
1.374**
[0.287]
–0.25
[1.669]
–0.253
[1.002]
0.4
76
FR
–0.582
[0.393]
0.24
174
FR
–0.524
[0.454]
0.35
[0.394]
0.244
174
FR
–0.596
[0.490]
0.283
[0.487]
–2.523
[2.476]
0.276
158
FR
–0.596
[0.491]
0.28
[0.509]
–2.522
[2.481]
0.054
[0.833]
0.276
158
NL
–0.006
[0.050]
0.058
176
NL
0.098
[0.102]
1.289***
[0.243]
0.312
176
NL
0.092
[0.108]
1.261***
[0.245]
0.656
[0.547]
0.311
160
NL
0.087
[0.101]
1.154***
[0.221]
–0.175
[0.618]
0.390
[0.341]
0.326
160
AUT
–0.122
[0.163]
0.145
176
AUT
–0.01
[0.132]
0.853**
[0.334]
0.196
176
AUT
–0.029
[0.133]
0.798**
[0.352]
0.347
[0.904]
0.199
160
AUT
–0.044
[0.135]
0.708*
[0.346]
0.351
[0.972]
0.381*
[0.180]
0.214
160
BEL
0.153
[0.160]
0.058
186
BEL
0.229
[0.162]
0.875*
[0.403]
0.101
186
BEL
0.137
[0.233]
0.925**
[0.415]
0.924
[0.743]
0.115
170
BEL
0.094
[0.237]
0.913*
[0.430]
0.435
[0.641]
0.436
[0.247]
0.134
170
FIN
0.184
[0.170]
0.085
176
FIN 
0.152
[0.164] 
1.065** 
[0.239] 
0.35
176
FIN 
0.138
[0.188] 
1.075** 
[0.236] 
–0.620** 
[0.264] 
0.37
160
FIN 
0.144
[0.190] 
1.068** 
[0.233] 
–0.602** 
[0.263] 
0.12
[0.132] 
0.372
160
Notes: * Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. btc: bias in technological change. 
r2w=within groups R squared.
4.
Policy-relevant conclusions
In this report we have developed an innovative measure for determining equilibrium 
wage levels. Our measure for equilibrium wages and competitiveness defines 
conditions under which wage increases are compatible with competitiveness. We 
have argued that wages matter for competitiveness, but without an appropriate 
benchmark it is impossible to say whether wages are too high or too low. However, 
it is also true that wages are an important component of aggregate demand. When 
austerity policies seek to lower wages in order to improve competitiveness, they 
cut demand and reduce output and therefore affect the productivity of capital and 
labour negatively, which in turn hampers competitiveness. Greece is the most 
dramatic example of such a vicious circle. 
So-called wage-led growth theories have argued that because austerity is often 
associated with falling wage shares and rising unemployment, increasing the wage 
share could overcome the negative effects of austerity. But these theories ignore the 
effects of higher wages on competitiveness. They do not have an explanation for the 
equilibrium level of wages and the wage share (which is the same as real unit labour 
costs), and therefore suffer from not being able to assess whether the demand effect 
of higher wages is or is not compensated by a loss of competitiveness.
A reasonable benchmark for determining equilibrium wage levels in the European 
Union, we have argued, can be derived from the return on capital in a given country 
or industry relative to the average return on capital in the euro area. Wage levels are 
competitive if they are below equilibrium, contributing to levels of profitability that 
are above the euro area average, so that they can attract investment and accelerate 
economic growth. By contrast, wages above equilibrium hamper regional and 
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sectoral growth. We have found a clear relationship between deviations of national 
and sectoral growth rates caused by the wage gap, and this relationship is better 
explained by our index than by conventional unit labour cost–based measures. 
Thus, competitiveness positions within the currency area will determine regional 
and sectoral divergences in growth rates and they are therefore an important 
variable for designing strategies of balanced growth. 
With regard to balanced growth in the European Union, it might be justifiable to 
accept competitive wage undervaluations in catch-up regions with low per capita 
income, but this cannot be a sustainable strategy for more advanced countries. 
In fact, it would be reasonable to have wage levels slightly above equilibrium in 
rich countries and below in poor countries. Table 1 has documented that the new 
member states in central and eastern Europe have huge wage undervaluations, 
which clearly distort balanced growth in the European Union. 
A correction of these disequilibria would generate a significant demand boom in 
all member states. However, left to market forces – that is, relying on Philips-
curve dynamics and no deliberate wage policy – the correction would be slow; 
our estimates indicate that it would take on average three years and 10 months 
to reduce a wage gap by half. By contrast, a deliberate one-off wage increase of 
20 per cent in all those countries in which actual wages are more than 20 per cent 
below equilibrium would yield a demand stimulus of 1.9 per cent for the EU (2.1 
per cent for the euro area) in terms of GDP and 17.6 per cent in terms of intra-EU 
trade. Such a stimulus could improve the fiscal position in Europe’s southern crisis 
countries and contribute to price stability in an environment in which inflation is 
presently hovering at zero per cent or falling into negative territory, although it 
would also slow down catch-up growth. Wage developments always have structural 
implications.
Implications for wage bargaining
Trade unions seek higher wages for workers. The margins for wage increases 
depend on the development of equilibrium wages. If we use the return on capital 
as the evaluative benchmark, capital productivity, technological change and the 
transformation of an economy’s supply side move into the focus of analysis. In 
this case, wage setting rules become more complex than the frequently used Rehn-
Meidner rule, whereby nominal wages ought to increase at a rate that is the sum 
of labour productivity growth and inflation. This rule ensures that the wage share 
remains constant, so that wage bargaining is distributionally neutral. However, the 
return on capital is defined as the product of the wage share and nominal capital 
productivity (which we have called average capital efficiency). Distributional 
neutrality becomes counter-productive when technological change modifies the 
capital intensity of production, thereby shifting the productivity of capital and 
labour and the share of capital required to remunerate capital. Hence, changes in 
average capital efficiency will affect the equilibrium wage and competitiveness and 
this needs to be taken into account in wage bargaining.
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In general and ceteris paribus, the sector-specific equilibrium wage will increase 
if the productivity of capital increases faster in a given industrial sector or region 
than in the euro area as a whole. Thus, if an industry or country needs to improve 
its competitiveness, it must focus on policies that increase capital productivity. This 
is easily said, but difficult to do. Such a complex policy objective is not achieved by 
simple rules of thumb, such as the Rehn-Meidner rule. 
Whether a sector will actually gain competitiveness will depend on whether actual 
wages reflect these improvements in capital efficiency. But this adjustment is usually 
determined by the political regime of wage negotiations. In decentralised regimes, 
where wage increases reflect marginal labour productivity, the gap between actual 
and equilibrium wages can be expected to be minimal. By contrast, with centralised 
wage setting, where actual wage levels reflect average productivity levels, the 
sectoral gaps may be substantial, so that the highly productive sectors attract 
additional investment. This is the case, for example, in Scandinavia, where highly 
productive sectors gain competitiveness at the margin, By contrast, decentralised 
wage bargaining, as in Anglo-Saxon-type countries, can sustain competitiveness 
by wage flexibility, but this will slow down productivity improvements and 
technological progress.
Because the average efficiency of capital in a sector or country is defined in nominal 
terms, competitiveness will depend not only on technological factors, but also on 
the relative prices of capital inputs and output relative to the euro area. In order 
to minimise distortive effects resulting from changes in average capital efficiency, 
economic and monetary policy ought to focus not only on the stability of consumer 
prices, but also on the relative stability of regional and sectoral indicators for 
GDP deflators and price indices for capital goods. If a country’s average inflation 
(measured by the GDP deflator) exceeds that of the euro area, the equilibrium 
wage will temporarily increase, but as the prices for capital goods catch up with the 
general price level, the effect will be annulled (see equation 6). Thus, what matters 
most in the long run is the development of capital productivity.
The long-run factors determining sectoral and regional capital and labour 
productivity in real terms are complex and require further research. Our study 
has nevertheless revealed that equilibrium wages in euro area member states 
depend crucially on changes in the capital–labour ratio, which is dependent on 
the importance of relative factor prices (the cost of labour relative to the cost of 
capital) and technical change biases. We found that the actual performance in 
different countries varies partly because different sectors respond differently to 
varying technological change. While technological progress has a tendency to affect 
manufacturing and services in similar ways, outsourcing and exports do not have 
the same effect. This means that wage bargaining in different sectors has to be 
careful to take into account the effects of technology and the related reorganisation 
of labour relations on the productivity of capital and labour. 
This analysis is of great importance for designing a balanced growth strategy for 
Europe. The relative importance of specific sectors varies significantly between 
member states of the euro area (see Table 3). As a consequence, the evolution 
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of equilibrium wages will change as well. However, the sectoral distribution of 
economic activity alone is not enough to determine a region’s competitiveness. As 
the Figures A1 in the annex show, it is frequently the case that an industry has a 
competitive advantage with regard to the average of the euro area overall, but not 
with regard to the specific European industry. In other words, while a particular 
sector may be a growth sector with attractive returns to capital in general, a given 
member state may not perform as well as its neighbours in this sector. For example, 
manufacturing in Belgium, which represents 15.7 per cent of value added, is 
competitive relative to the European average, but not with regard to manufacturing 
in the euro area. By contrast, this country is highly competitive in agriculture and 
IT services. In France, manufacturing has lost its competitiveness with regard to 
other countries’ manufacturing industries, but its manufacturing sector still yields 
higher returns on capital than the euro average. In Germany most sectors have 
undervalued wage levels, although less competitive sectors – mostly in services and 
agriculture – account for slightly more than 20 per cent of total value added. 
Dealing with these discrepancies does not make policy advice easy. There is no 
simple rule of thumb, although better knowledge would help to negotiate wage 
deals that generate sustainable wage increases. Of course, sector-specific wage 
gaps and imbalances can be corrected up or down by diversified wages settlements 
in each sector and country. However, as the aggregate picture for Greece shows, 
when nominal wage setting affects productivity and production functions, wage 
restraint can be as detrimental as wage exuberance. A more sustainable approach 
would require a coherent economic policy approach that removes inhibitions to 
technological progress and focuses on supporting the growth of productivity in labour 
and capital. The European Commission has suggested that national governments 
set up National Competitiveness Boards. However, uncoordinated national 
boards will not take into account relative competitive, which depends on the 
average performance of the euro area. It would be better to set up a European 
Competitiveness Board, possibly in the EESC (European Economic and Social 
Committee), where the national social partners are already represented.
Cooperation between social partners, especially if it is institutionally founded, 
is surely more likely to generate positive results in the long run. This raises the 
question of what the right social model for Europe would be. 
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Appendix 1
Sectoral evolution of actual and equilibrium wages
Figure A1.1 Austria
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Figure A1.2 Belgium
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Figure A1.3 Czech Republic
Average wage (compensation per employee)
Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.4 Denmark
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.5 Finland
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Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.6 France
Average wage (compensation per employee)
Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.7 Germany
Average wage (compensation per employee)
Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.8 Italy
Average wage (compensation per employee)
Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.9 Netherlands
Average wage (compensation per employee)
Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.10 Norway
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.11 Poland
Average wage (compensation per employee)
Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.12 Spain
Average wage (compensation per employee)
Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A1.13 United Kingdom
Average wage (compensation per employee)
Equilibrium wage (sector-specific RoC) Equilibrium wage (average RoC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Appendix 2
Decomposition of the relative ACE effect
Figure A2.1 Austria
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0
1
2
3
4
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
AUT MTextile 0.5 AUT MWoodPaper Pr 2.1 AUT MPharm 0.8
AUT MMachinery 2.2 AUT MElectronic s 2.3 AUT MVehicles 1.2
AUT WaterWaste 1.1 AUT Construction 7.1 AUT TradeRep 12.9
AUT Finance 14.3 AUT ICTSvc 1.4 AUT RD 0.2
AUT HealthCare 6.0 AUT ArtEntert 1.2 AUT Total 100.0
110
Figure A2.2 Belgium
BEL AgricFish 0.9 BEL MFoodBev 2.2 BEL Manufacturing 15.7
BEL MPharm 1.0 BEL MChemicals 2.3 BEL MRubPlMin 1.5
BEL MVehicles 1.1 BEL MOTransp 0.2 BEL ElectGas 2.1
BEL AccFoodSvc 1.7 BEL TransStor 6.1 BEL Telecom 1.8
BEL ProfSvc 12.7 BEL PA 7.4 BEL Education 6.7
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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BEL MTextile 0.7 BEL MWoodPaperPr 1.1 BEL MCokePetr 0.5
BEL MMetals 2.4 BEL MMachinery 1.0 BEL MElectronics 1.0
BEL WaterWaste 0.8 BEL Construction 5.5 BEL TradeRep 12.5
BEL Finance 15.3 BEL ICTSvc 1.5 BEL RD 0.2
BEL HealthCare 7.1 BEL ArtEntert 0.6 BEL Total 100.0
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A2.3 Czech Republic
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A2.4 Denmark
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A2.5 Finland
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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FIN HealthCare 8.8 FIN ArtEntert 1.2 FIN Total 100.0
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Figure A2.6 France
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A2.7 Germany
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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DEU WaterWaste 1.1 DEU Construction 4.5 DEU TradeRep 9.9
DEU Finance 16.1 DEU ICTSvc 1.5 DEU RD 0.4
DEU HealthCare 6.8 DEU ArtEntert 1.4 DEU Total 100.0
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Figure A2.8 Italy
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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ITA HealthCare 5. 4 ITA ArtEntert 1.0 ITA Total 100.0
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Figure A2.9 The Netherlands
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A2.10 Norway
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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NOR ArtEnter t 1.1 NOR Total 100.0
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Figure A2.11 Poland
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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POL MVehicles 1.2 POL MOTransp 0.3 POL MOther 1.7
POL TradeRep 18.9 POL AccFoodSvc 1.2 POL TransStor 5.5
POL ProfSvc 6.9 POL PA 5.4 POL Education 5.0
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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POL ElectGas 3.2 POL WaterWaste 1.2 POL Construction 7.4
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POL HealthCare 3.5 POL ArtEntert 0.8 POL Total 100.0
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Figure A2.12 Spain
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A2.13 United Kingdom
Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Relative capital inflation
Relative capital productivity Relative GDP inflation
Note: Relative capital inflation=(Pkx/Pk€); relative capital productivity=(Y€/K€)/(Yx/Kx); relative GDP inflation=(P€/Px). 
See equation (6). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
GBR Manufacturing 12.3 GBR MTextile 0.4 GBR MWoodPaperPr 1.1
GBR MMetals 1.5 GBR MMachinery 0.9 GBR MElectronics 1.2
GBR WaterWaste 1.1 GBR Construction 6.6 GBR TradeRep 11.5
GBR Finance 16.9 GBR ICTSvc 2.8 GBR RD 0.4
GBR HealthCare 7.1 GBR ArtEntert 1.5 GBR Total 100.0
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Appendix 3
Sectoral evolution of actual and equilibrium hourly wages in 
selected countries
Figure A3.1a France, manufacturing sectors
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A3.1b France, services
Average compensation, sector-specific RoC Average compensation, average RoC
Hourly compensation, sector-specific RoC Hourly compensation, average RoC
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A3.2a Germany, manufacturing
Average compensation, sector-specific RoC Average compensation, average RoC
Hourly compensation, sector-specific RoC Hourly compensation, average RoC
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A3.2b Germany, services
Average compensation, sector-specific RoC Average compensation, average RoC
Hourly compensation, sector-specific RoC Hourly compensation, average RoC
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
138
Figure A3.3a Italy, manufacturing
Average compensation, sector-specific RoC Average compensation, average RoC
Hourly compensation, sector-specific RoC Hourly compensation, average RoC
ITA MChemicals ITA MCokePetr ITA MElectronics
ITA MFoodBev ITA MMachinery ITA MMetals
ITA MPharm ITA MRubPlMin ITA MTextile
ITA MWoodPaperPr
0
1
2
3
4
5
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0
10
20
30
40
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A3.3b Italy, services
Average compensation, sector-specific RoC Average compensation, average RoC
Hourly compensation, sector-specific RoC Hourly compensation, average RoC
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Source: Authors’ elaboration of Eurostat and OECD data.
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Figure A3.4a Spain, manufacturing
Average compensation, sector-specific RoC Average compensation, average RoC
Hourly compensation, sector-specific RoC Hourly compensation, average RoC
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Figure A3.4b Spain, services
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Appendix 4
List of sectors
Table A4.1 Sectors definitions, codes and abbreviations
 Full name
Agriculture, forestry and fishing
Mining and quarrying
Manufacture of food products; beverages and tobacco products
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products
Manufacture of wood, paper, printing and reproduction
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic mineral 
products
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Electronics and electrical equipment
Motor vehicles
Other transport equipment
Manufacture of furniture; jewellery, musical instruments, toys; repair and 
installations
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Accommodation and food service activities
Transportation and storage
Telecommunications
Finance and real estate
Computer programming, consultancy, and information service activities
Scientific research and development
Professional services 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
Education
HealthCare
Arts, entertainment and recreation
Total - All NACE activities
NACE-3
C01T05
C10T14
C15T16
C17T19
C20T22
C23
C2423
C24X
C25T26
C27T28
C29
C30T33
C34
C35
C36
C40
C41
C45
C50T52
C55
C60T63
C64
C65T70
C72
C73
C74
C75
C80
C85
C92
CTOTAL
Short name
AgricFish
MinQuar
MFoodBev
MTextile
MWoodPaperPr
MCokePetr
MPharm
MChemicals
MRubPlMin
MMetals
MMachinery
MElectronics
MVehicles
MOTransp
MOther
ElectGas
WaterWaste
Construction
TradeRep
AccFoodSvc
TransStor
Telecom
Finance
ICTSvc
R&D
ProfSvc
PA
Education
HealthCare
ArtEntert
Total
